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RHETORIC, REALITY, AND ASYLUM LAW
NatalieNanasi*
ABSTRACT

The terms terrorism and terrorist are highly charged but all too often
imprecisely utilized in legal, media, and political arenas. The terminology has even
entered the field of intimate partner violence, where the phrases terrorism in the
home or intimate terrorism have been used to describe domestic abuse. This
language has proliferated not only due to identified commonalities between
intimate partner abuse and terroristic behaviors but also because of the rhetorical
impact of the words in highlighting the gravity of domestic violence. However,
expanding the legal framework of terrorism into new areas has potentially serious
and far-reaching consequences. It is therefore critical to carefully analyze the
impact of reconceptualizingintimatepartnerabuse as a form of terrorism.
This Article undertakes such an analysis with a focus on asylum law. It
ultimately concludes that even though reconceptualizing intimatepartnerabuse as
terrorism in the home may accurately describe the political and societal
implications of domestic abuse (as well as the state's complicity in perpetuatingit)
and has the potential to expand access to asylum for survivors, the terrorist label
should be applied with caution. The decision to designate a violent act a terrorist
act is often political in nature, and race and religious affiliation are frequently
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decisive factors in assigning the label. Moreover, significant criminal and
immigration consequences exist for those who are branded terrorists and those
who harbor or materially support terrorists, potentially including survivors
themselves. Recognizing these drawbacks, this Article calls for selective and
limited use of the intimate terrorism framework-effectively defining the
phenomenon without utilizing the label-in the asylum law system.
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INTRODUCTION

The labels of terrorism or terrorist are ones that are frequently, and often
imprecisely, utilized in modern day legal, media, and political arenas. The terms
have been used to describe a wide variety of events like the attacks of September
11, 2001, the election of Donald Trump as president,' police officers' treatment
of minorities, 2 public demonstrations, 3 liberal activism," homophobia,5 and even

1. Peter Holley, A Professor Called Trump's Election an 'Act of Terrorism.' Then She Became
the Victim of Terror., WASH. PosT (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2016/12/27/a-professor-called-trumps-election-an-act-of-terrorism-then-she-became-thevictim-of-terror/ [http://perma.cc/P9AS-HKXM].
2. Greg Howard, The Police Are America's Terrorists, DEADSPIN: THE CONCOURSE (Apr. 8,
2015, 9:25 PM),
http://theconcourse.deadspin.com/the-police-are-americas-terrorists-1696463523
[http://perma.cc/CT9A-YGVY]; see also Michael Eric Dyson, America's Blue Wall of Terror: Why
Black People Fear the Police, and Why White People Refuse To Believe It, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 19,
2017), http://newrepublic.com/article/139940/americas-blue-wall-terror [http://perma.cc/EK8G-JE44].
3. Jim Brunner, Trump Supporter in State Senate Says Some ProtestsAre 'Economic Terrorism,'
Should Be Felonies, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016, 10:04 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/politics/state-senator-some-protests-should-be-treated-as-felonies/
[http://perma.cc/2477-S6QY]
(discussing a bill that would "allow felony prosecution of protesters who purposely break the law to
disrupt economic activity, for example by blocking traffic or sitting on railroad tracks").
4. See, e.g., GrrrGraphics Cartoons (@GrrrGraphics), TWITTER (Aug. 28, 2017, 11:16 AM),
http://twitter.com/grrrgraphics/status/902172983690592257?lang=en
[http://perma.cc/4G67-8688]
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the United States' political process.6 To further complicate matters, variants of
terrorism like ecoterrorism,7 cyberterrorism, 8 and paper terrorism 9 have also
worked their way into the public lexicon.
Professor Isabel Marcus was the first to use the terrorist label to describe
intimate partner or domestic violence; she coined the term "terrorism in the
home" because she felt it had "the greatest potential for accurately identifying
the psychological, sociological, and political situation of women who are the
targets of . .. violence."' 0 Others in the academy," government,1 2 media, 3 and

(sharing a political cartoon by Ben Garrison that depicts the rhetoric of critics of President Trump,
including Madonna, Kathy Griffin, Michael Moore, and Rachel Maddow, lighting the fuse of a bomb
labeled "FAR LEFT TERROR").
5. Alison Meuse, Beirut Has Become a Relative Refuge for Members of the LGBT Community
(NPR radio broadcast May 23, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/05/23/529634880/beirut-has-become-arelative-refuge-for-members-of-the-lgbt-community
[http://perma.cc/GTZ9-HSVR]
(describing a
Pride Week slogan and ad campaign, "Homophobia is Terrorism," in Lebanon).
6. See Calif. Lawmakers Extend Cap-and-Trade Program Through 2030 (NPR radio broadcast
July 25,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/2017/07/25/539183562/calif-lawmakers-extend-cap-and-tradeprogram-through-2030 [http://perma.cc/KV8F-FQHZ] (quoting California Governor Jerry Brown
describing entrenched views and alliances as "political terrorism"). But see Melinda Henneberger,
Let's Not Call Dallas Shootings 'Terrorism,' ROLL CALL (July 11, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/terrorism-a-wrong-headed-description-of-dallas-attack
[http://
perma.cc/2MTN-KBVH].
7. See Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler & Cas Mudde, Ecoterrorism:Threat or PoliticalPloy?, WASH. PosT
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/19/ecoterrorismthreat-or-political-ploy/ [http://perma.cc/3UPX-S4GK].
8. See
Dan
Holden,
Is
Cyber-Terrorism
the
New
http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/01/is-cyber-terrorism-the-new-normal/
HVHC] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
9.

Normal?,
WIRED,
[http://perma.cc/TFA2-

See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN

OVERVIEw 46 (2017), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf [http://perma.cc/EB57-ZRSF]. Paper
terrorists engage in a broad range of nonviolent actions and utilize the legal system to harass,
intimidate, or defraud either a government or private entity or individual. Methodologies "include
forging documents (fake money orders and bad personal checks, for example), failing to pay taxes,
phony tax filings, . . . presenting sham legal arguments in court[, and] . . . fil[ing] fraudulent property
liens against . . . foes." Id. Paper terrorists may also create their own legal systems through which they
"hold illegal courts and target officials with fake criminal indictments .. . [or] 'issue warrants for judges
and police officers."' Id. (quoting FBI, Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement (Apr. 13,
2010),
http://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_041310/domesticterrorism-the-sovereign-citizen-movement [http://perma.cc/98UK-CJGF]).
10.

Isabel Marcus, Reframing "Domestic Violence": Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC

NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 11, 18-19 (Martha Albertson

Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
11.

See,

e.g., MICHAEL P. JOHNSON,

TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE,

AND

A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE
SITUATIONAL

COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008); Justine

A.

Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There's an App for That, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10 (2012);
Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate
Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919 (2011); Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The
Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National
Violence Against Women Survey, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 322 (2005); Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating
Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379, 1387-94 (2005)
(using the term "[i]ntimate [t]errorism").
12.

See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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legal community 4 soon followed suit and popularized terms such as terrorism in
the home or intimate terrorism to describe domestic abuse.' 5
Use of the terrorist label to describe intimate partner violence is increasing
not only due to identified commonalities between domestic abuse and terroristic
behaviors but also because of the rhetorical force the word terrorist has in
highlighting the gravity of domestic violence. The label "fits" and is effective for
advocacy, which makes the temptation to use it great. However, due to the
serious negative implications of expanding the framework of terrorism into new
subject and legal areas, it is critical to carefully analyze the impact of
reconceptualizing intimate partner abuse in such a manner.
This Article undertakes such an analysis, focusing on asylum law. Section I
begins by comprehensively cataloguing definitions of terrorism in domestic and
international law and identifying the most salient elements of the term. This
definitional work continues in Section II, which describes intimate partner
violence. Section III then addresses the commonalities between domestic abuse
and terroristic behaviors. It focuses on the similar profiles of batterers and
terrorists and the comparable tactics they use, highlighting both groups' need to
provoke fear and assert control.
Section IV explores immigration law, including the history of how courts
use both particular social group and political opinion grounds to determine

Crime & CriminalJustice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 46 (1994) (statement of Mark
Wynn, Sergeant, Nashville Metropolitan Police Department) ("I am grateful that our national leaders
have given this crime, which I like to call domestic terrorism, the attention that it deserves.");
Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs
and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 4 (1990); Lynne
Marek,
U.S.
Joining War on Domestic Violence,
CHI. TRIB.
(Mar.
12,
1994),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-03-12/news/94031200681_domestic-violence-shalala-domesticpartner [http://perma.cc/ZKE2-84YE] (quoting then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala as pledging "to put the federal government back in the fray of fighting ... 'terrorism in the
home"').
13. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Stop Calling It Domestic Violence. It's Intimate Terrorism.,
COSMOPOLITAN (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/advice/a4322/intimateterrorism/ [http://perma.cc/TJ58-8FME]; Julianne Escobedo Shepherd, 'Intimate Terrorism': San
Bernardino Murderer Was a Serial Domestic Abuser, JEZEBEL (Apr. 12, 2017, 2:10 PM),
http://jezebel.com/intimate-terrorism-san-bernardino-murderer-was-a-seria-1794261873
[http://perma.
cc/CZ4Z-FL34].
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, The National Crime Victim Law Institute et al., in Support
of State of Oregon at 4-6, State v. Tena, 412 P.3d 175 (Or. 2018) (No. SC S064500), 2017 WL 2305708.
15. Even if domestic violence is not officially labeled as terrorism, commonalities exist between
the narratives around the two issues. For example, domestic violence advocates have borrowed from
the Department of Homeland Security's "See Something, Say Something" campaign, which
encourages the public to report suspicious and potentially terroristic behavior, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND
SECURITY, If You See Something, Say Something, http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something
[http://perma.cc/78XP-LDZP] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019), by encouraging bystanders to intervene and
report domestic abuse. Angela Frederick Amar, See Something Say Something: You Have the Power
To Do Something About Domestic Violence, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Oct. 9, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/see-something-say-something-you-have-the-power-to-dosomething-about-domestic-violence [http://perma.cc/2UPU-TZLC].
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eligibility for asylum for survivors of intimate partner abuse. It also details why
and how reframing domestic abuse as terrorism could impact the legal cases of
survivors seeking asylum in the United States.
Section V discusses the benefits of reconceptualizing intimate partner
violence as terrorism for purposes of asylum law. It posits that reframing
emphasizes the severity of domestic abuse, which in turn allows for a broader
understanding of both the political nature of gender-based violence and the
home country's complicity in perpetuating it. Section VI then details the
drawbacks of applying the terrorist label, with a focus on the significant criminal
and immigration consequences that befall terrorists and anyone who is found to
have materially supported or harbored them, including potentially survivors
themselves. This Section also presents critiques of using the terrorist label from
an intersectional feminist perspective.
Ultimately, this Article calls for selective and limited use of the intimate
terrorism framework in the asylum law system. Reconceptualizing domestic
violence as terrorism in the home accurately describes the political and societal
implications of intimate partner abuse. Thus, the terrorist label has the benefit of
potentially expanding access to asylum for survivors, which is particularly
important as legal remedies for those who have experienced domestic violence
grow increasingly limited in the Trump era.16 However, the potential for serious
collateral consequences cautions against sweeping application of the terrorist
designation. In recognition of both the racialized and politicized use of the term,
as well as the potential significant immigration consequences for both
perpetrators and survivors, the terrorist label should be used with restraint.
I.

"DEFINING" TERRORISM

In order to determine whether the label of terrorism is appropriate to
describe intimate partner violence, it is first necessary to attempt to define
terrorism itself. A precise definition has long eluded both lawmakers and
scholars; undertaking the task of defining terrorism is so difficult that it has been
compared to the quest for the Holy Grail." Terrorism is not a legal term of art,
and as Professor Yonah Alexander has described, there exists a "definitional and
18
moral confusion over what constitutes terrorism."
Attempts at defining the term are often contested and politicized, which has
contributed to the challenge of arriving at a single accepted domestic or
international definition. Moreover, experts have noted that individuals tend to
use the word terrorism broadly and imprecisely-often interchangeably with
extremism-effectively "to mean a kind of violence of which he or she does not

16. See infra Part IV.A for an analysis of how immigration courts currently determine asylum
status for survivors of intimate partner violence.
17. Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of
Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249 (2004).
18. Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses, 12
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 61 (2000).
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approve."1 9 This has led to disparate use of the term in the media, across the
political spectrum, and in the legal system. 20
Race and religion play a significant role in whether someone is designated a
terrorist. Professor Tung Yin explained that the inconsistency of application of
the label of terrorist often relates to the perpetrator's race or religious
affiliation.21 For example, John Allen Muhammad, the "Beltway Sniper," and
Army psychologist Nidal Hassan, who killed thirteen people and wounded thirty
others at the Army base in Fort Hood, are both Muslim and were characterized
as terrorists by the media and in the legal system.22 In contrast, Jared Lee
Loughner, who shot Representative Gabrielle Giffords and killed six others, was
described as a mentally ill gunman and Dylann Roof, who murdered nine
African American churchgoers in South Carolina, was convicted of hate crimes
and murder, not terrorism. 23 As Professor Yin concluded, "Terrorism-like crimes
committed by Arab- or Muslim-Americans get treated as terrorism, but similar
crimes by non-Arabs/non-Muslims, while punished harshly, are generally not
24
viewed as terrorism."
Thus, designation as a terrorist is hardly a neutral act; much often depends
on the perspective, biases, and intentions of the individual assigning the label.
This is especially true because "[t]he very use of the word not only describes an

19. Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
119,124.
20. See id. A Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) report provides a striking
example of the impact imprecise use of the terms terrorist and terrorismcan have on the legal system.
The TRAC report found that courts, federal prosecutors, and the National Security Division of the
Department of Justice apply different criteria in classifying, charging, and prosecuting individuals as
terrorists. See TRAC, Who Is a Terrorist? Government Failure To Define Terrorism Undermines
Enforcement, Puts Civil Liberties at Risk, TRAC REP. (Sept. 28, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/terrorism/215/ [http://perma.cc/6HUX-2FKP].
21. Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race,
Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33, 35 (2013) [hereinafter Yin,
The Only White Terrorists?].
22. Tung Yin, Is It Terrorism or Mass Murder? That Depends on Our Biases., WASH. POST
(June 16, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/is-it-terorrism-or-mass-murder-that-dependson-our-biases/2017/06/16/5ad57414-5211-11e7-91eb-9611861a988fstory.html
[http://perma.cc/J8Z3WONK] [hereinafter Yin, Terrorism or Mass Murder?]. Muhammad had a long history of intimate
partner violence. See Charreah Jackson, Mildred Muhammad: D.C. Sniper's Ex-Wife Shares Her Story,
ESSENCE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.essence.com/2009/10/19/mildred-muhammad-dc-snipers-ex-wifeshar-1 [http://perma.cc/JTL6-YEKM]. His ex-wife is now an advocate for survivors of domestic abuse.
See Mildred D. Muhammad, About Me, http://mildredmuhammad.com/?page-id=717 [http://perma.
cc/V7SG-KLDU] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
23. Yin, Terrorism or Mass Murder?, supra note 22. Both Loughner and Roof are young white
men. Dana Ford, Who Commits Mass Shootings?, CNN (July 24, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/2015/06/27/us/mass-shootings/index.html [http://perma.cc/BPZ5-PFAL].
24. Yin, The Only White Terrorists?, supra note 21, at 35. In highlighting the conflation of
Arabs, Muslims, and terrorists, Professor Adrien Katherine Wing posited that "[i]t's like one word:
Arabterrorist." Adrien Katherine Wing, Global CriticalRace Feminism:A Perspective on Gender, War
and Peace in the Age of the War on Terror, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1,7 (2007).

2019]

ARE DOMESTIC ABUSERS TERRORISTS?

221

event but also assigns a moral judgment to the act and the actor, a moral
judgment, which is nearly universally negative." 25
Turning to the U.S. legal system, a range of definitions of terrorism exists in
statutes, regulations, executive orders, and even state codes. 26 The first such
definition promulgated in the U.S. Code was added by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).27 It defines "international terrorism" as
activities that(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State ... ; [and]
(2) appear to be intended(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping . . 28
FISA's description of terrorism, with its focus on underlying criminal law and
29
acts of intimidation, served as a model for several subsequent definitions.
The federal criminal code (Title 18 of the U.S. Code) is unsurprisingly the
source of many definitions of terrorism. Section 2331 of the Code, as amended
by the USA PATRIOT Act, 30 includes definitions for both international and
domestic terrorism that are nearly identical to the international terrorism

25.

Perry, supra note 17, at 252.

26. Analysis of definitions of terrorism in countries other than the United States is beyond the
scope of this Article. For discussion of non-U.S. definitions, see Keiran Hardy & George Williams,
What Is "Terrorism"?:Assessing Domestic Legal Definitions, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77,
81 (2011), which reviews laws in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand,
and India and concludes that "legislatures across the world have created a plethora of diverse
definitions of terrorism." Id. See generally Antonio Cassese, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of
Terrorism in International Law, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 933 (2006) (arguing that customary
international law has established a definition of international terrorism during times of peace, but that
this definition is inapplicable during times of armed conflict); Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes
and InternationalCo-Operation: CriticalRemarks on the Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the
Category of InternationalCrimes, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 533 (2008) (proposing a definition of terrorism in
the absence of agreement under positive international law); Ben Saul, Definition of "Terrorism" in the
UN Security Council: 1985-2004, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 141 (2005) (analyzing efforts of the U.N.
Security Council to confront terrorism despite its inability to define the term); Elisabeth SymeonidouKastanidou, Defining Terrorism, 12 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 14 (2004) (exploring
challenges faced by EU member states in defining terrorism); Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The
Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in InternationalLaw and Its Influence on Definitions in
Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 23 (2006) (undertaking a detailed study of
international instruments containing definitions of terrorism).
27.

See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2018).

28.

50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2018).

29.

Perry, supra note 17, at 256.

30. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2331).
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definition found in FISA. 31 Interestingly, "neither of the definitions in § 2331
provides a basis for prosecuting acts of terrorism under federal law. Instead,
these definitions were enacted for the limited purpose of seeking court orders
and search warrants against individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist
activity." 32 Yet despite this substantive limitation, the Section 2331 definitions
are referenced in numerous other statutes, including those governing biological
agents and toxins, 33 civil liability for acts of international terrorism, 34 and the
grant of immunity for airline employees who report potential terrorist
behavior. 35 Regulations also reference the Section 2331 definition, including
those that provide grants for assistance to victims of crime. 36 According to
experts, "Through such wide application in a variety of contexts, the definitions
in § 2331 are among the most significant . .. in federal law." 37
Section 2331, however, is not the only area of the federal criminal code that
addresses terrorism. Section 2339 criminalizes harboring or concealing
terrorists, 38 Section 2339A proscribes providing material support to terrorists, 39
0
and the firearms chapter of the Code contains a definition as well. 4
Beyond the federal criminal code, a vast array of government agencies
define terrorism in a variety of legal areas. Significantly, as Section VI of this
Article discusses, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines both
"terrorist activity" 4 1 and "engage in terrorist activity." 42 The Military
Commissions Act defines terrorism for the purpose of prosecuting unlawful
enemy combatants in U.S. military commissions. 43 The State Department's
definition is used as the standard for its annual reports on terrorism and to
designate terrorist organizations. 44 There are definitions in the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act 45 and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.46 The
Department of Housing and Urban Development;4 7 the Bureau of Alcohol,

31.

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), (5) (2018), with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c).

32.

Hardy & Williams, supra note 26, at 156.

33.
34.
35.

7 U.S.C. § 8401(e)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 262a(e)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)).
49 U.S.C. § 44941(a) (2018) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3077, which refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2331).

36. Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) Victim Assistance Grant Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,444,
56,448 (proposed Sept. 3, 2002) (revising Guidelines for Victims of Crime Act Victim Assistance Grant
Program, § I(N) and § 1(0)).
37.

Perry, supra note 17, at 257.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

18 U.S.C. § 2339.
Id. § 2339A.
Id. § 921(a)(22).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 § 601(a), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2018).
Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3, 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24) (2018).
See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2018).
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323-

46.

Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 129, 49 U.S.C. § 44703(g)(3) (2018).

47.

See 24 C.F.R. § 573.2 (2018).

24.

ARE DOMESTIC ABUSERS TERRORISTS?

2019]

223

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; 48 the Department of the Treasury; 49 and the
FBIso each have their own definitions. There are definitions relating to foreign
electronic surveillance. 5 ' Terrorism has also been defined in executive orderS 52
and by states in their criminal codes. 53 Ultimately, the sheer magnitude of usage
led the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence's Subcommittee on Terrorism to conclude that "practically every
agency in the United States government with a counterterrorism mission uses a
different definition of terrorism." 54
International attempts to arrive at a definition of terrorism have not fared
better than those in the United States. The United Nations began debating the
definitional issue in 1972 after the deadly attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympic Games.5 5 The United Nations' Ad Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism attempted to define the term, but it ceased its efforts when it was
unable to achieve consensus after six years. 56 Decades later, the attacks of
September 11, 2001, galvanized the international community to combat acts of
terror. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, passed mere days after the
attacks, charged member states to enact terrorism offenses in their domestic
criminal codes.5 The Resolution did not, however, provide a definition of
58
terrorism for nations to utilize in their work.
The international situation currently mirrors the situation in the United
States: many related but different definitions located in various international
instruments, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism 59 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566.60 A

4&

See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2018).

49.

See 31 C.F.R. § 594.311 (2018).

50.

28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2018).

51.

50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2018).

52. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001). President George W. Bush issued
Executive Order 13,224 on September 23, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. Id. at 786-87. It authorizes the Department of the Treasury to block the assets of foreign
individuals and entities that commit or pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism as well as
those that provide support, services, or assistance to or otherwise associate with terrorists and terrorist
organizations. Id. § 1(b).
53. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 29D-14.9 (West 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1)
(McKinney 2019).
54. Michael Saba, Is 'Terrorism' Being Defined by the 'Terrorists?,' ARAB NEWS (June 19, 2004,
3:00 AM), http://www.arabnews.com/node/251298 [http://perma.cc/MSM8-FV6Q].
55.
(2004).

Alex Schmid, Terrorism-The DefinitionalProblem, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 385

56. See Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.O. 537, 539
(2004). The political issues that led to the inability of the Ad Hoc Committee to arrive at an
international definition are perhaps best summed up by the familiar adage, "one person's terrorist is
another person's freedom fighter." See id.
57.

S.C. Res. 1373, 12 (Sept. 28, 2001).

5&

See id.

59.

G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 2(1)(b) (Feb. 25, 2000).

60. S.C. Res. 1566, 1 3 (Oct. 8, 2004). The definitions in the Financing Convention and Security
Council Resolution 1566 are considered "the most authoritative international definitions of terrorism
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significant number of regional conventions also address the issue of terrorism,
both directly and indirectly.61
What first emerges from a study of both domestic and international law is
that a singular definition of terrorism is elusive. But a review of attempts to
define the term also reveals some agreement regarding the elements and nature
of terrorism. First, terrorism is distinct from generalized crime. "Legally and
morally, . .. intent . .. distinguish[es] terrorism from mass murder." 62 Therefore,
for a violent act to constitute terrorism as opposed to simply a crime, a violent
tactic (such as a bombing or a shooting) must be committed with an identifiable
terroristic motive. 63
A landmark study 64 by scholar Alex Schmid helps elucidate this requisite
motive or intent. 65 Schmid catalogued 109 different definitions of terrorism and
identified 22 elements that appeared in more than 1 definition. 66 He found that
only three of these elements-violence/force, political, and fear/terrorappeared in at least half of the proposed definitions.6 7 The other most frequently
appearing
elements
are
threat;
psychological
effects;
victim-target
differentiation; purposive, planned, systematic, organized action; and method of
combat/strategy. 68 Schmid's work thus demonstrated that, though terrorists
frequently have political aims, they have equally significant objectives to instill
fear or evoke similarly threatening or psychological effects.
Ultimately, given the complicated political issues at stake, a precise legal
definition of terrorism may remain elusive for the foreseeable future. Schmid's
definitional analysis therefore remains the closest to consensus that exists in the
field, with three key elements both characterizing terrorist activity and
differentiating it from other crime: (1) perpetration of violent acts (2) with the
purpose of instilling fear and (3) with political motivations. 69 Thus, these
elements compose the definition of terrorism utilized in this Article.
available because they have received express support from several influential international bodies in
recent years." Hardy & Williams, supra note 26, at 93-94. "The Canadian Supreme Court and the
England and Wales Court of Appeal have also expressed support for the Financing Convention and
Resolution 1566 definitions." Id. at 94.
61.

See Alexander, supra note 18, at 92-94.

62.

Yin, Terrorism or Mass Murder?, supra note 22.

63. Put another way, "unlike ordinary criminals-who are often driven by self-centered motives
such as profit and tend to opportunistically seek easy prey-domestic terrorists are driven by a cause
or ideology." BJELOPERA, supra note 9, at 6. However, the Congressional Research Service notes that
even though ideology can be a differentiating hallmark of terrorist actors, it alone cannot distinguish a
terrorist from a criminal, as "ideologically motivated actors can also collaborate with profit-driven
individuals to commit crimes." Id.
64.

See CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON, TERRORISM TODAY 32 (2008) (calling Schmid's work the

"best-known work on this problem of definitions").
65.

See ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM:

A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS,

THEORIES, DATA BASES AND LITERATURE 119-52 (1983).

66.

Id. at 76-77.

67.

Id.

6& Id. Other relevant elements include intimidation (14), unpredictability (18), repetitiveness
(20), and criminal nature of the acts (21). Id.
69.

See Jessie Blackbourn et al., Academic Consensus and Legislative Definitions of Terrorism:
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DEFINING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

'

Like terrorism, the definition of intimate partner violence has evolved over
time and lacks a single, simple, or universally accepted definition. The U.S.
Department of Justice has defined domestic violence as
a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one
partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate
partner. Domestic violence can be physical, sexual, emotional,
economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions that influence
another person. This includes any behaviors that intimidate,
manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten,
blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone.7 0
This federal definition includes several key components of the phenomenon
that experts recognize as domestic abuse-a pattern of deliberate behavior, the
presence of a dynamic of power and control, and tactics that encompass physical
or sexual violence as well as many forms of emotional or psychological abuse.7
The inclusion of nonphysical violence is critical, for as Professor Evan Stark
argued in his seminal book, Coercive Control, patterns of manipulative behavior
that restrict a woman'S 72 liberty or freedom can ultimately be more damaging
than violations of bodily integrity. 73
Although domestic violence was at one time presumed to be a crime of
passion brought on by uncontrolled anger or substance abuse, it is now

Applying Schmid and Jongman, 34 STATUTE L. REV. 239, 260-61 (2012) ("Terrorism is some form of
purposive and planned violence that has a political, religious, or ideological motivation. It is intended
to coerce or intimidate and is targeted at civilians or government.").
70.

Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Nov. 2011),

http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfsdomesticviolence.html
[http://perma.cc/2WDA-L48R].
In
April 2018 this definition of domestic violence was removed from the Department of Justice's website.
It was replaced with a more limited statutory definition that recognizes as domestic violence only
harms that constitute a felony or misdemeanor crime. See Natalie Nanasi, The Trump Administration
Quietly Changed the Definition of Domestic Violence and We Have No Idea What For, SLATE (Jan. 21,
2019,
1:00
PM),
http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/trump-domestic-violence-definitionchange.html [http://perma.cc/9SDB-V26P].
71.

See ImmigrantPower and Control Wheel, NAT'L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE,

http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Immigrant%20P&C%20wheel%20NO%20SHADING%20%20NCDSV-ICE-updated2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/BA7V-4LGB] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). The
Power and Control Wheel is a tool that organizes and describes the most common tactics used by
abusers to exert dominance in a relationship. See id. It references physical and sexual violence as well
as emotional abuse, isolation, use of children and male privilege, economic abuse, threats,
intimidation, and blaming. See id.
72. Although both men and women experience intimate partner abuse, this Article uses female
pronouns to refer to survivors because the groups are not equally impacted: one in four women has
been the victim of severe physical violence by a partner as opposed to one in seven men. CDC,
NATIONAL DATA ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND STALKING (2014),

http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-fact-sheet-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7GUS-FPVF].
Another study reports that between 1994 and 2010, four in five victims of domestic violence were
female. Statistics, NAT'L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org/resources/
statistics/ [http://perma.cc/YD3LG9H7] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
73.

(2007).

EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: How MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 13-14
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understood to be purposeful behavior utilized by an abusive partner to achieve a
desired result.74 As Professor Donna Coker explained,
much of current literature on battering notes that the violence,
contrary to earlier psychoanalytic explanations, is instrumental rather
than expressive. In other words, the violence is not only an expression
of rage, but serves a purpose. In general, that purpose is to control his
wife or lover, to gain compliance with his demands. . . . It is part of a
system of control and is frequently accompanied by threatening
behavior, destruction of property, sexual, verbal, and economic
abuse .75
It is widely recognized that the intended purpose of intimate partner violence is
for an abuser to maintain power and control over his partner.7 6 Feminist scholars
have also identified a related motive, which is to preserve authority and
superiority.77 They have argued that abusers "see themselves as rightfully in
control of their wives or partners and feel aggrieved and victimized when these
women try to assert some independence." 7 8
In a landmark book, Professor Michael Johnson used the concept of
coercive control to distinguish between three different forms of violence that
might occur within a relationship. Intimate terrorism describes what had
previously been subsumed under the general category of domestic violence-a
cycle of abuse through which mental, emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, as
well as economic and social isolation, were used to exercise control over another
person. 7 9 This cyclical and controlling behavior does not exist in the two other
categories-violent resistance (self-defense) and situational couple violence
(isolated incident(s) of abuse).80 As Johnson explained,
A slap from an intimate terrorist who has taken complete control of his
partner's life is not the same as a slap from a generally noncontrolling
partner in the heat of an argument, and of course neither of these is the
same as the desperate use of violence by a woman who is being
physically and emotionally terrorized by someone she loves. 8

74. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Myths and Misconceptions, ARIZ. COALITION TO END SEXUAL
& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.acesdv.org/domestic-violence-graphics/domestic-violence-mythsand-misconceptions/ [http://perma.cc/676E-F8GY] (dispelling the myth that "[d]omestic violence is an
impulse control or anger management problem"); Drugs, Alcohol and Abuse, NAT'L DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE HOTLINE (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.thehotline.org/2015/03/11/drugs-alcohol-and-abuse/
[http://perma.cc/62AD-78BS](explaining that while drugs and alcohol can exacerbate abuse, they are
not its root cause).
75. Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 85 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
76. See, e.g., Johnson & Leone, supra note 11, at 322 (describing domestic violence as "violence
that is embedded in a general pattern of controlling behaviors, indicating that the perpetrator is
attempting to exert general control over his partner").
77. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Hostile Domestic Environments: Commentary on Jane Maslow
Cohen's Regimes of Private Tyranny, 57 U. PITT L. REV. 809, 811-12 (1996).
7&

E.g., id.

79.

See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 25-47.

80.

Id. at 72.

81.

Id.
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Under this framework, it is not the nature of a single incident that determines
the severity or category of relationship violence. The abuse, and the abuser
himself, are properly understood only when viewed in "the control context in
which they are embedded." 8 2
Lastly, the notion that intimate partner violence is, at its core, about
coercive control forms the basis of the theory of separationviolence or separation
assault.83 Those terms describe situations wherein a challenge to an abuser's
control, such as an attempt to separate or leave the relationship, leads the abuser
to retaliate against a survivor with escalating violence.84 Separation violence was
best described by Professor Martha Mahoney as "the attack on the woman's
body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving,
retaliate for the separation, or force her to return. . . . It is an attempt to gain,
retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the
relationship."s The risk of violence and death thus increases when a woman
leaves or seeks to leave her abuser.86 Violence, or the threat of violence,
becomes "an efficient way to put down challenges to authority"87 and to make "a
statement to women about the kind of relationship they believe they are entitled
to. In this sense, battering is a way of organizing a relationship so that men
88
continue to feel superior to women."
III. REFRAMING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM
As noted in the Introduction, Professor Isabel Marcus was the first to
reframe intimate partner violence as domestic terrorism. Her rationale for the
reconceptualization was based on a recognition that domestic abuse is more than
just a series of isolated incidents of violence committed by one partner against
another in the privacy of their home or relationship. Instead, she argued that
"the use of coercive means, including violence and abuse, for securing or
89
maintaining . . . power" in a relationship has political and societal implications.
The label of terrorism, Marcus claimed, therefore better expressed both the

82.

Id. at 2.

83. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1991).
84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 769 (2005)
("[D]ata show that the time when a victim decides to break free [from] a violent relationship is the
most dangerous time; it is the time when the majority of domestic violence homicides occur."). Experts
have found "that a battered woman is 75 percent more likely to be murdered when she tries to flee or
has fled, than when she stays." Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims
Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 19, 19. And even if a victim is not murdered, at least half of women
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by them. Mahoney, supra note
83, at 64.
87.

Chamallas, supra note 77, at 813.

88.

SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE

BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 224 (1982).

89.

Marcus, supra note 10, at 22 (citation omitted).
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gravity of and society's collective responsibility for allowing intimate partner
abuse to occur. 90
Although seemingly radical, Marcus was neither the first nor the only
scholar to attempt to reframe domestic violence in order to more appropriately
convey its severity and societal implications. Scholars have reconceptualized
intimate partner abuse as involuntary servitude, 9 1 torture, 92 discrimination, 93
criminal coercion, 94 and patriarchal or intimate terrorism 95 (concepts similar to
Marcus's). Scholars have posited that domestic violence constitutes a violation of
various rights, including international human rights 96 and civil rights, 97 as well as
international law.98 Others have analogized it to broader social ills such as
tyranny 99 and war.100
An evolving understanding of domestic violence is also not a recent
phenomenon. A significant change in the conception of domestic abuse occurred
in the 1970s when, soon after the problem of intimate partner violence gained
widespread recognition and attention, the battered women's movement sought

90.

Id. at 31.

91. See generally Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary
Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 209 (1992) (examining the
"theoretical, doctrinal and factual connections between involuntary servitude and intimate violence").
92. See generally Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994) (examining domestic violence "in
light of the evolving international legal understanding of torture").
93. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against
Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251 (2003)
(situating violence against women in the legal category of discrimination).
94. See generally Joan Erskine, Note, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Recharacterizing Domestic
Violence as Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207 (1999) (arguing that intimate partner violence
should be characterized as criminal coercion or a pattern of intimidation aimed at controlling the
victim's actions).
95. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 25-47 (differentiating between intimate terrorism and
situational couple violence); Johnson & Leone, supra note 11, at 332-44 (same).
96. See generally Julia L. Perilla, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue: The Case of
ImmigrantLatinos, 21 HISP. J. BEHAV. SC. 107 (1999) (examining the issue of domestic violence from
a human rights perspective); Dorothy 0. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a
Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119 (1995) (exploring a conceptualization of domestic violence
as a human rights violation).
97. See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigmfor Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123 (1999) (proposing a mechanism
to assess motivation that can guide courts in determining when violent acts are sufficiently gender
biased to warrant federal civil rights intervention).
98. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights,
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994) (arguing that private violence against women constitutes a violation
of international law).
99. See generally Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to
Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1996) (utilizing the term "private
tyranny" to describe domestic abuse).
100. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women's September 11th: Rethinking the
International Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2006) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Women's
September 11th] (advocating for consideration of violence against women as a war against women).
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to depict the issue as a public, rather than a private, problem.' 0 ' This conceptual
shift, which suggested that society had a responsibility to remedy domestic abuse,
led to the expansion of protections for survivors, including shelters and social
services. New legal remedies, such as protective orders and criminal sanctions 102
(including controversial mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies' 03),
also emerged.
Ultimately, it is clear that domestic violence has long been ripe for
reexamination and refraining. As Professor Martha Challamas explained,
I sometimes refer to domestic violence as a "feminist harm" in the
sense that, as a phenomenon, domestic violence has not attained fixed
boundaries. Like sexual harassment, domestic violence is constantly in
the process of being conceptualized and reconceptualized by feminist
practitioners and theorists. The challenge for many feminists is to
provide thick descriptions of women's suffering and in the process to
04
expose the inadequacy of the conventional legal categories.1
Reconceptualizing intimate partner violence as terrorism is supported by
the commonalities between the two issues. Abuse in the home appears to be a
"psychological training ground" 05 for and regular precursor to mass attacks.1 06
A study conducted by the advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety revealed
that of the mass shootings committed in the United States from 2009 to 2016,
more than half were related to domestic or family violence, meaning that the
perpetrator shot a current or former intimate partner or family member.1 07

101. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1991)
("Over the last twenty years, however, as the battered women's movement in this country has made
issues of battering visible, battering is no longer perceived as a purely 'private' problem and has taken
on dimensions of a 'public' issue.").
102. See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 9 (2004); Natalie
Nanasi, The U Visa's Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
273, 290-92 (2018) (describing and critiquing mandatory legal interventions in cases involving
immigrant survivors of intimate partner violence); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic
Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuationof the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1160 (1994);
Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An
Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 320 (2004).
103. Mandatory arrest policies compel officers who respond to a domestic violence call to
effectuate an arrest once probable cause has been established. David Hirschel et al., Domestic
Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256 (2007). Pursuant to mandatory, or no-drop, prosecution policies,
prosecutors are not permitted to dismiss criminal charges in a domestic violence case, even if the
victim does not want to cooperate with the prosecution or see it proceed. Angela Corsilles, Note, NoDrop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous
Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 858 (1994). Scholars have criticized these policies both as being
disempowering and potentially dangerous for survivors. See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 102, at 9.
104.

Chamallas, supra note 77, at 811.

105. Amanda Taub, Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in
Common, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1rplMPO [http://perma.cc/2ULN-FRLD].
106. As discussed in Section II supra, a mass shooting is not necessarily always an act of
terrorism, but it is a close analogue for purposes of the discussion here.
107.

EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, MASS SHOOTINGS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009-2016, at
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Anecdotal evidence from recent attacks confirms these findings and
demonstrates a striking correlation between public and private violence,
indicating that domestic violence is a significant predictor of mass violence.
Omar Mateen, who killed forty-nine people and wounded fifty-three others in a
shooting at an Orlando gay nightclub, "had an extensive history of domestic
abuse."' Cedric Ford went on a shooting rampage at a manufacturing plant in
Kansas ninety minutes after a court issued a family violence protective order
against him.10 9 Robert Lewis Dear, who killed three people and wounded nine at
a Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood clinic in 2015, had previously been
arrested for sexual violence and rape." 0 "At least two of his three ex-wives ha[d]
accused him of physical abuse.""' Man Haron Monis, who held caf6 patrons
hostage in Sydney, Australia, in 2014, eventually killing two and wounding four,
"had terrorized his ex-wife."11 2 James Hodgkinson, who attacked a congressional
baseball practice in June 2017, had previously been arrested for domestic battery
and discharge of a firearm.11 3 Mohamed Bouhlel, who drove a truck through a
Bastille Day celebration in 2016, was known to French authorities for abusing his
wife.11 4 Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Marathon bombers, had
previously been arrested on a domestic violence charge.11 5 The ex-wife of Khalid
Masood, who drove his car into a crowd of pedestrians near Westminster Palace
in London,11 6 "had fled her ex-husband in terror after just three months of
marriage."" 7

3-5
(2017),
http://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MassShootings-ResearchReport-121018A-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/NPG9-KNZ8].
108. Rebecca Traister, What Mass Killers Really Have in Common, CUT (July 15, 2016),
http://www.thecut.com/2016/07/mass-killers-terrorism-domestic-violence.html
[http://perma.cc/HVT6JEVN].
109. Greg Botelho et al., Kansas Shooting: Sheriff Believes Protection Order Sparked Carnage,
CNN (Feb. 27, 2016, 9:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/26/us/kansas-shooting/index.html
[http://perma.cc/E8T2-BNZV].
110. William Wan, Before Colorado Shooting, a Trail of Allegations of Violence Against Women,
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/before-colorado-shooting-along-history-of-violence-against-women/2015/12/01/7f494c86-987b-11e5-8917-653b65c809eb-story.html
[http://perma.cc/5WTX-FTKL].
111.

Id.

112.

Taub, supra note 105.

113. Jane Mayer, The Link Between Domestic Violence and Mass Shootings, NEW YORKER
(June 16, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-link-between-domestic-violence-andmass-shootings-james-hodgkinson-steve-scalise [http://perma.cc/ZT3L-VPCD].
114. Rafia Zakaria, Toxic Masculinity, DAWN (June 14, 2017), http://www.dawn.com/news/
print/1339370 [http://perma.cc/FS3R-3KDS].
115. Matthew Mosk & Michele McPhee, Accused Boston Bomber Faced 2009 Arrest on
Domestic Violence Charge, ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/accusedboston-bomber-faced-2009-arrest-domestic-violence/story?id=19017079
[http://perma.cc/S35VEQLV].
116. Haroon Siddique, Westminster Attacker Lawfully Killed by Minister's Bodyguard, Jury
Finds, GUARDIAN (London) (Oct. 12, 2018, 12:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/
oct/12/westminster-bridge-attack-khalid-masood-lawfully-killed-inquest-concludes
[http://perma.cc/P464-THEX].
117.

Hadley Freeman, Opinion, What Do Many Lone Attackers Have in Common? Domestic
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Beyond this long list of examples, scholars have highlighted parallels
between the tactics utilized by terrorists and batterers. Marcus noted three
commonalities: "unannounced and seemingly random but actually calculated
attacks of violence; psychological as well as physical warfare aimed at silencing
protests and minimizing retaliatory responses . . . ; and the creation of an
atmosphere of intimidation in which there is no safe place of escape."" 8 Alex
Schmid's elements of terrorism-perpetration of violent acts with the purpose of
instilling fear and with political motivations-also overlap significantly with
domestic abuse.11 9 Both terrorists and abusers utilize violence, force, fear, terror,
and threats to intimidate 20 and control victims.121 The purposeful nature of
domestic abuse as well as its unpredictable but repetitive nature also mimic
terroristic behavior. Lastly, as this Section discusses in further detail below, both
groups have political aims for their violence.1 22
In addition to their methods, the profiles of terrorists and batterers are also
comparable. Eighty percent of terrorists are male 23 as are the majority of
domestic abusers.1 24 People from all backgrounds commit terrorist attacks (as
well as domestic abuse),1 25 so a "single terrorist personality" does not exist, but
"certain psychological types of people may be attracted to terrorism." 126 A study
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress identified several
personality traits of potential terrorists, including frustration-aggression,
negative identity,1 27 and narcissistic rage.1 28 Researchers studying the psychology

Violence, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 28, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/mar/28/lone-attackers-domestic-violence-khalid-masood-westminster-attacksterrorism [http://perma.cc/YM6S-VVPG].
118.

Marcus, supranote 10, at 31.

119.

See SCHMID, supra note 65, at 76.

120.

See REX A. HUDSON, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

OF TERRORISM:

WHO

BECOMES A TERRORIST

AND

WHY? 20 (Marilyn

Majeska

ed.,

1999),

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/SocPsych-of_Terrorism.pdf [http://perma.cc/5RYR-G3U7] (noting
that "terrorism is an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation").
121.

SCHMID, supra note 65, at 119-23.

122. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for an analysis of the overlap of political
aims among domestic abusers and terrorist actors.
123. HUDSON, supra note 120, at 52 (analyzing data from 1976 to 1986); Michael Kimmel,
Almost All Violent Extremists Share One Thing: Their Gender, GUARDIAN (London) (Apr. 8, 2018,
6:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/violent-extremists-share-one-thing-gendermichael-kimmel [http://perma.cc/4M58-C4M9].
124. See Debra Houry et al., Differences in Female and Male Victims and Perpetratorsof Partner
Violence With Respect to WEB Scores, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1041, 1042-43 (2008) (noting
that "it is well acknowledged that the majority of victims of injury-related violence are heterosexual
women" and that intimate terrorism "is primarily perpetrated by men against women").
125. See L. Kevin Hamberger & James E. Hastings, Personality Correlates of Men Who Abuse
Their Partners:A Cross-Validation Study, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 323, 338 (1986) ("No single 'abuser
personality' was found."); see also Catherine A. Simmons et al., Personality Profiles of Women and
Men Arrested for Domestic Violence: An Analysis of Similarities and Differences, 41 J. OFFENDER
REHABILITATION, no. 4, 2005, at 63, 66 ("[N]o one 'abuse profile' exists.").
126.

HUDSON, supra note 120, at 60.

127. Negative identity is "marked by indifference or antipathy to something that much of
society views as fundamental." Nancy Leong, Negative Identity, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59
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of domestic abusers have identified similar characteristics that are prevalent
among that group, including "antisocial, aggressive-sadistic, passive-aggressive
(negativistic),"'1 29 and "narcissistic/antisocial personality disorder."1 30
Attorney and author Rafia Zakaria noted that the "same mechanics of
justification that are at the root of intimate terrorism, the idea that the abuse is
'for the good of the woman' to correct her or to teach her a lesson, lie at the
heart of the justification of terrorist acts."131 Terrorist actors use a similar
framework to justify the killing of innocent people as "a correction for society,
for the larger good."1 32 Zakaria, like Marcus, also listed pathologies that are
present in both terrorists and batterers: "The psychological need for control, the
attraction toward simple solutions to what are complex social problems, . .
33
hyper aggression and attraction to portraying outward 'strength.""1
Ultimately, both terrorism and intimate partner abuse are, at their most
basic levels, attempts to use violence or the threat of violence to provoke fear
and assert control.1 34 A terrorist seeks to assert power and control through acts
of public violence against strangers whereas a domestic abuser expresses the
same terroristic tendencies in his home against his intimate partner. And,
perhaps contrary to public perception, an abuser's actions in the home also have
significant political implications.
Whereas the political aims of a "traditional" terrorist are often clear-for
example, to protest or seek to change the actions of a government-the political
objectives of a man who abuses his wife are less obvious. This is perhaps
unsurprising, as domestic violence is often "minimized, or denied, or viewed as
individual and aberrant rather than a culturally justified and endorsed systemic
35
practice designed to silence and to coerce a clearly identifiable population."1
Only upon deeper examination is the cultural and sociopolitical nature of
intimate partner violence realized, but once that lens is used, it becomes
apparent that at the root of intimate partner violence is an effort to maintain
patriarchy within a personal relationship. Thus, violence in the home is a
reflection of societal views of male dominance. Put another way, one purpose of
domestic abuse is to maintain the status quo-to prevent the perpetuation of
feminist or progressive ideas into the home and, by extension, to society writ
large.

(2015).
128.

HUDSON, supranote 120, at 20-21.

129.

Simmons et al., supra note 125, at 66-67.

130.

Hamberger & Hastings, supra note 125, at 338.

131.

Zakaria, supra note 114.

132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134. See Rachel Pain, Everyday Terrorism: Connecting Domestic Violence and Global
Terrorism, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 531, 536 (2014) ("[E]veryday terrorism is political,
contested and understood by its capacity to instil [sic] fear through coercive control."); Taub, supra
note 105 (quoting Deborah Epstein, "who runs Georgetown University Law Center's domestic
violence clinic," as saying that "[i]ntimate terrorism stems from that desire to control").
135.

Marcus, supranote 10, at 17.

2019]

ARE DOMESTIC ABUSERS TERRORISTS?

233

What constitutes a political aim within an intimate relationship may not fit
the traditionally understood definition of "political," but the definition of
political is neither unanimous nor static, even in the field of terrorism. For
example, Professor Wayne McCormack has noted that although "the classic
definitions of terrorism have sought to distinguish it from ordinary criminal
behavior by looking at political objectives, . . . very few of the Islamic groups
have genuine 'political' objectives in the sense of controlling and governing
definable territory."1 36
Moreover, political success is difficult to achieve using traditional terrorist
activity. Thus, if achievement of political objectives is used as a measure, as
Schmid did in his definitional analysis,1 37 one can argue that domestic violence is
more akin to terrorism than what currently merits that label. As Professor
Rachel Pain noted, global terrorism "does not always live up to its intent of
instilling fear, and its achievement of political influence is very mixed. Everyday
terrorism [(domestic violence)] creates more fear and trauma because it is more
38
frequent and prolonged, and takes place within the intimate sphere."1
Therefore, "[t]he loss of freedoms, self-sufficiency, safety and emotional
tranquility are the same outcomes that global terrorists aim for, though evidence
39
suggests that abusive partners achieve them more effectively."1
Ultimately, the significant overlap between the actions, tactics,
psychological profiles, and political objectives of domestic abusers and terrorist
actors supports a definitional reconceptualization of intimate partner abuse as
terrorism in the home. The impact of such a reframing on domestic violencebased asylum law is the subject of the remainder of this Article.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM LAW

Establishing eligibility for asylum protection, particularly when the
persecution faced is intimate partner violence, is a legally complex and
challenging task. An analysis must begin with the refugee definition, which
determines eligibility for asylum in the United States. Section 1101(a)(42)(A) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a "refugee" as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . .
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
40
political opinion.1

136.

WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 63 (1st ed. 2007).

137.

See supra notes 64-69.

138.

Pain, supra note 134, at 540.

139. Lucy Berrington, Domestic Violence Is Terrorism with More Victims, WOMEN'S ENEWS
(July 17, 2012), http://womensenews.org/2012/07/domestic-violence-terrorism-more-victims/
[http://

perma.cc/AK6V-TRCS].
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018).
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A full analysis of the refugee definition is outside the scope of this Article,
but critical here are two concepts: (1) a state's role in persecuting the refugee, or
"state action," 141 and (2) "nexus." Nexus requires persecution to be "on account
of" one of the five grounds listed in the definition: "race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."1 42 All published
asylum cases granting relief to survivors of intimate partner violence have
utilized the particular social group ground because gender is not one of the
enumerated categories of protection.1 43 Thus, an in-depth exploration of asylum
law must begin with an examination of that phrase and its use in domestic abuse
cases.
A.

Asylum for Survivors of Intimate PartnerViolence
1.

Particular Social Group

Like the refugee definition itself, the law of particular social group is
nuanced and complex. As even the immigration courts have identified, "[o]f the
five statutory grounds for asylum, the meaning of membership in a particular
social group is perhaps the least well defined and the most robustly debated."1 44
Courts have struggled with defining and interpreting the phrase, not only due to
the ambiguity inherent in the term itself but also due to the lack of legislative
history surrounding its inclusion in the refugee definition.1 45 The question of
whether survivors of domestic violence constitute a particular social group was
the subject of litigation for years until 2014, when the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA or Board) recognized that survivors can compose a legally viable
group.1 46 However, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions recently overturned
that seminal case, 147 returning great uncertainty to the area.
Under existing law, a particular social group must possess four elements:
immutability, social distinction, particularity, and noncircularity. The seminal

141.
asylum.
142.

See infra Section IV.B for a discussion of state action as it relates to the definition of
8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A).

143. See, e.g., Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by Matter
of A-B-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
144. Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's Eligibility for Relief at 6,
Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) (No. A 73 753 922) [hereinafter DHS Brief in Matter
ofR-A-].
145. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Both courts and commentators
have struggled to define 'particular social group.' Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is
almost completely open-ended. Virtually any set including more than one person could be described as
a 'particular social group.' Thus, the statutory language standing alone is not very instructive. Nor is
there any clear evidence of legislative intent." (footnotes omitted)); see also Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505,
510-11 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The legislative history behind the term ... is uninformative, and judicial and
agency interpretations are vague and sometimes divergent. As a result, courts have applied the term
reluctantly and inconsistently.").
146.

See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 388-89.

147.

See Matter ofA-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
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1985 case of Matter of Acosta"48 created the immutability requirement.1 49 In that
case, the BIA defined a particular social group as comprising individuals who
share "a common, immutable characteristic" that either cannot be changed or is
"so fundamental to [the individuals'] identit[ies] or conscience[s]" that they
should not be required to change it. 15 This "shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties or, in some circumstances, it might
be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership."' 5
Twenty years later, the Board added two additional requirements. The first
being that the group possess "social distinction"- evidence showing that society
in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular
characteristic to be a group."1 52 A group must also be sufficiently "particular,"
which the Board defined as "whether the proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in
the society in question, as a discrete class of persons."1 53 Lastly, a viable
particular social group cannot be circular, meaning it cannot be defined by the
harm that the applicant claims as persecution.1 54
Intimate partner violence asylum jurisprudence demonstrates the challenge
of applying these particular social group criteria. The first major case in the area
was Matter of R-A-.1 5 5 Rodi Alvarado endured years of horrific abuse at the
56
hands of her husband, whom she married when she was just sixteen years old.1
She fled to the United States and was granted asylum by an immigration judge
(IJ), but that was only the start of what would ultimately be a fourteen-year legal
battle.1

57

After the Government appealed the grant of asylum, the BIA reversed,
finding that Ms. Alvarado failed to demonstrate that her husband harmed her on

148. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
149.

See Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 212.

150.

Id. at 233.

151.

Id.

153. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008); see also Matter of A-M-E
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73-74 (B.I.A. 2007).

&

152. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014).

154. See, e.g., Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the particular
social group of "women subjected to rape as a method of government control" was impermissibly
circular); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the particular social group of
"women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas").
155. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I.
& N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), stay lifted, 24 1. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
156.

Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908.

157. See Matter of R-A-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-r-a- [http://perma.cc/P2U2-A3B7] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter History of
Matter of R-A-]. The IJ granted Ms. Alvarado's claim based on her membership in the particular
social group of "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination." Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 911.
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account of her membership in a particular social group.' The Department of
Justice, recognizing the novelty of the legal issues involved, released a proposed
rule intended to provide guidance on gender-based asylum claims.15 9 After two
attorneys general intervened in the still-pending case, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS),1 60 the agency tasked with advancing the interests of
the U.S. government in immigration proceedings, filed a brief in which it
supported a grant of asylum for Ms. Alvarado based on her membership in the
particular social group of "married women in Guatemala who are unable to
leave the relationship."161 Four years and two more attorneys general later, an IJ
in San Francisco granted Rodi Alvarado asylum.1 62
Because the grant of asylum in Matter of R-A- was at the trial court level, a
precedential decision did not issue at the resolution of the case, and the issue of
whether survivors of domestic violence were eligible for asylum in the United
States remained unresolved. Therefore, a new asylum case involving a survivor
of intimate partner violence, Matter of L-R-,1 63 soon made its way through the
courts.1 64 The IJ denied Ms. L-R-'s claim.1 65 Although DHS initially defended
the IJ's ruling at the BIA, DHS eventually reversed its position.1 66 In a
supplemental brief, DHS articulated two particular social groups that it
considered viable for women seeking asylum based on domestic violence:
"women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" and "women who
are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic
relationship." 6 7 After review of the DHS brief, the BIA remanded Matter of
L-R- to the IJ, DHS stipulated to eligibility, and the IJ granted asylum.1 68

158. Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 923 ("In the end, we find that the respondent has failed
to show a sufficient nexus between her husband's abuse of her and the particular social group the
immigration judge announced, or any of the other proffered groups.").
159. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13). Nearly twenty years later, this proposed regulation has yet to be
finalized or enacted. Compare id., with 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2018) (current regulation).
160. History of Matter of R-A-, supra note 157 (noting that in 2001 "Attorney General (AG)
Janet Reno vacat[ed] Matter of R-A-, with order of remand to the BIA to decide the case when the
DOJ regulations are finalized," and that in 2004 "[a]fter AG John Ashcroft certif[ied] Matter of R-Ato himself again, the ... (DHS) file[d] a brief urging asylum for Rody Alvarado").
161.

DHS Brief in Matter ofR-A-, supra note 144, at 15.

162. See Matter of Alvarado Pena (case number redacted) (Executive Office for Immigration
Review Dec. 10, 2009) (on file with author); see also History of Matter of R-A-, supra note 157. The
IJ's decision was brief, reading simply, "Inasmuch as there is no binding authority on the legal issues
raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept what is essentially the agreement of the
parties [to grant asylum]." Matter ofAlvarado Pena (case number redacted).
163.

(case number redacted) (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009).

164. See Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-l-r [http://perma.cc/V9C4-2F43] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter History of Matter
of L-R-].
165.

Id.

166.

Id.

167. Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental at 14, Matter of L-R-, (case number
redacted) (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Brief in Matter of L-R-], http://cgrs.uchastings.
edu/sites/default/files/MatterofLRDHSBrief_4_13_2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/EYR5-3UAY]. DHS
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After decades of uncertainty and ambiguity both during the pendencies of
and after the resolutions of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-, in 2014 the BIA
issued a published decision that addressed the eligibility of survivors of domestic
violence for asylum. 6 9 Matter of A-R-C-G-1 70 involved a survivor who married
her abuser when she was just seventeen years old.171 She suffered "repugnant
abuse," "includ[ing] weekly beatings" and sexual violence.1 7 2 The Board found
(and DHS conceded) that the abuse Ms. A-R-C-G- suffered was on account of
her membership in the particular social group of "married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationship."1 7 3
The certainty provided by Matter of A-R-C-G- was, however, short-lived. In
June of 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions certified to himself and
subsequently issued a decision in Matter of A-B-1 74 that explicitly overruled
Matter of A-R-C-G- .17 In his opinion, Sessions made the sweeping assertion that
claims "pertaining to domestic violence ...
perpetrated by non-governmental
actors will not qualify for asylum."1 76 He described intimate partner abuse as
"private violence" 7 7 and held that survivors can therefore not compose a
particular social group because each is "a victim of a particular abuser in highly
individualized circumstances." 7 8
Although Matter of A-B- casts doubt on the viability of asylum claims
involving domestic violence,1 7 9 the opinion does not stand for the proposition

noted that the particular social groups were crafted with consideration of the society in which the
applicant lived, specifically that women in Mexico "occupy a subordinate position." Id.
168. History of Matter of L-R-, supra note 164. Much like the final order in Matter of R-A-, this
decision is extremely brief and holds no precedential value. See id. "The order simply states that
asylum is granted, with a notation that the grant was a result of 'stipulation of the parties."' Id.
169. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-,
27 1. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
170.

26 1. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316.

171.

Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 389.

172.

Id.

173.

Id. at 388-90.

174. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Immigration courts are administrative agencies of the
executive branch-specifically, the Department of Justice. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen,
Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General's Review Authority,
101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 849 (2016). As such, the attorney general has the authority to refer to himself,
review, and issue a decision in any case pending before the BIA. See id. at 848-57.
175.

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.

176.

Id. at 320.

177.

Id. at 319.

178. See id. at 336. Sessions's focus on the specific relationship dynamics of survivors and their
abusers echoes the rationale often articulated by the BIA in its rejection of social group claims for
victims of domestic violence. For example, in Matter of R-A-, the Board called the particular social
group articulated by Ms. Alvarado "a legally crafted description of some attributes of her tragic
personal circumstances." Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec.
629 (A.G. 2008).
179. In addition to impacting domestic violence-based asylum claims, Matter of A-B- also poses
challenges for other claims utilizing the particular social group ground and involving persecution by
nonstate actors, including, for example, those based on gang-based persecution. See Matter ofA-B-, 27

238

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

'

that the "unable to leave" particular social group identified in Matter of
A-R-C-G- can never be viable. 80 The opinion is rife with dicta, and ultimately
Sessions's stated reasoning for overruling Matter of A-R-C-G- rests on his belief
that the BIA did not sufficiently analyze the particular social group in that case;
instead, Sessions held, the Board improperly relied on the concessions made by
DHS with respect to the particular social group formulation.' 8
Nevertheless, Matter of A-B- undoubtedly makes obtaining asylum for
survivors of intimate partner abuse significantly more challenging. While such
claims were previously disfavored-either because of floodgate concerns1 82 or
because gender and gender-based harms were not originally contemplated by the
drafters of the Refugee Convention 83 or the INA1 84 -Courts that were
previously disinclined to use the particular social group ground to grant asylum
to survivors of domestic violence18 5 now have a stronger basis to deny such
claims.
The difficulties experienced by survivors of intimate partner violence who
seek asylum in the United States stem not only from the challenges in the law

I. & N. Dec. at 320 ("Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to ...
governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.").

gang violence perpetrated by non-

180. In fact, in a recent decision, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
invalidated policies issued by former Attorney General Sessions that instructed asylum officers
to generally deny domestic violence claims. Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-CV-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL
6628081, at *36 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018). The court explained that "there is no legal basis for an
effective categorical ban" on such claims and granted a request for a permanent injunction against the
policies. Id. at 20.
181.

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 333.

182. Professor Karen Musalo explained the "floodgate" argument as a means for opponents to
advocate for the denial of legitimate asylum claims by either expressly or subtly alluding to fears that
the United States would be overwhelmed with female asylum seekers if it recognized gender-based
claims such as domestic violence and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). See Karen Musalo,
ProtectingVictims of Gendered Persecution:Fear of Floodgatesor Call to (Principled)Action?, 14 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 119, 132-33 (2007). However, these concerns have proven baseless as, for example,
after Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996), recognized a right to asylum based on being
a victim of FGM/C, Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 358, "dire predictions of a flood of women
seeking asylum [based on FGM] never materialized," Musalo, supra, at 133; see also Cece v. Holder,
733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) ("It would be antithetical to asylum law to deny refuge to a group of
persecuted individuals who have valid claims merely because too many have valid claims."); Perdomo
v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing "the principle that the size and breadth of a
group alone does not preclude a group from qualifying as such a social group").
183. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (including only those with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" within its definition
of "refugee"). The 1951 Refugee Convention is an international treaty that established the refugee
definition and provides the basis for U.S. asylum law. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018).
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (providing "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" as
the bases for asylum).
185. Data on grant rates based on type of claim are unavailable, but anecdotal evidence,
including the author's conversations with numerous immigration practitioners, suggests that domestic
violence based asylum claims are difficult to win, even during the brief time that Matter ofA-R-C-Gwas controlling precedent.
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but also the immigration adjudication system itself. A significant percentage of
asylum seekers appearing in immigration court are unrepresented, 8 6 and it is
unsurprising that asylum seekers who are represented by counsel are more likely
to win their cases. 8 A pro se litigant faces significant obstacles in establishing
and proving membership in a viable particular social group. A survivor who does
not speak English, has suffered significant trauma, and is unfamiliar with the
U.S. legal system would be unable to formulate a particular social group that is
sufficiently immutable, socially distinct, and particular, especially post-Matter of
A-B-.
Additionally, the petitioner bears the burden of proof in an asylum
case, 189 which is heard in an adversarial system where evidentiary burdens are
high. Demonstrating social distinction and particularity requires significant
documentary evidence and expert testimony regarding the culture and society in
the applicant's home country,1 90 which are difficult and expensive to obtain.191
Finally, as I have argued in a previous article, there are numerous
problematic aspects of the unable to leave and viewed as property particular
social groups that were frequently utilized prior to Matter of A-B-, which counsel
against their broad use. 192 The groups' focus on survivors' inability to leave an

186. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 32 (2015). Eagly and Shafer's study found that only thirty-seven
percent of asylum seekers were represented by counsel in cases decided during the six-year period
from 2007 to 2012. Id. at 16-17. The study also revealed that only fourteen percent of detained
immigrants secured representation. Id. at 32.
187.

Id. at 12; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM

SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS

AND JUDGES 30 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf [http://perma.cc/DZ3E-4LW9]
("Representation generally doubled the likelihood of affirmative and defensive cases being granted
asylum . . . ."); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) ("Represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of
45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel."); Andrew I.
Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 739-40 (2002) ("[R]epresented asylum cases are four to six times more likely to
succeed than pro se ones." (emphasis omitted)).
188. An additional hurdle was instituted in January 2018. In Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 189 (B.I.A. 2018), the BIA held that an applicant seeking asylum based on membership in a
particular social group must clearly indicate, on the record before the IJ, the exact delineation of any
proposed particular social group. See W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 191. Failure to articulate a
viable social group in an initial hearing could result in the summary denial of a claim. See id. at 193.
189.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).

190. See Joline Doedens, Comment, The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 22
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 111, 125 (2014) (stating that an asylum claim based on domestic violence
is "a very fact-intensive process that involve[s] the recruitment of experts to testify on the perception
of domestic violence in the applicant's country of origin, and extensive preparation of the applicant
herself (or himself), to ensure that she effectively portray[s] her perception of herself as a member of
the relevant social group, and that her abuser identified her as a group member as well").
191. A cartoon often shared by advocates aptly illustrates the challenges in obtaining evidence
for an asylum claim. In the drawing the "applicant appearing before an asylum officer asks, 'What kind
of evidence would be enough?' The asylum officer responds, 'A note from your dictator."' Stacy
Caplow, Putting the "I" in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective Personal Statement To Tell A Winning
Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING 249, 253-54 (2008).
192.

See Natalie Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum and the Perpetuation of the Victimization
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abusive relationship furthers an essentializing narrative of victimization and
helplessness that does not reflect the lives of many survivors, many of whom
actively fought against the abuse they endured.1 93 Forcing survivors to deny their
agency in order to receive protection also poses serious challenges to clientcentered and ethical advocacy.1 94
2.

Political Opinion

Given the limitations of particular social group as a basis for asylum for
survivors of domestic violence, political opinion is a potential alternative avenue
for relief.1 95 Although a political opinion is typically exhibited by "verbal or
openly expressive behavior . . . in furtherance of a particular cause," for the
purposes of asylum law, courts consider less public or overt acts to be political as
well, so long as the behavior is "motivated by an ideal or conviction." 196 Thus,
political opinions can be expressed through actions as well as words.1 97 The
doctrine of political opinion is sufficiently expansive that an applicant for asylum
need not even personally hold a particular political opinion-she can receive
asylum if she is threatened or harmed based on an opinion that is imputed onto
her by the persecutor.1 98
Asylum seekers have advanced political opinion claims in gender-based
asylum cases with mixed results. For example, in Fatin v. INS,1 99 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it had "little doubt that feminism qualifies
as a political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes," but it
ultimately denied the claim of the Iranian woman who held it. 200 In Lazo-

Narrative,78 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 754-65 (2017) [hereinafter Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum].
193.

See id. at 754-58.

194.

Id. at 758-60.

195. A claim based on religion may also be appropriate in certain cases, including, for example,
if the survivor's participation in religious activities precipitates violence. Although distinguishable as a
case of child abuse and not intimate partner abuse, Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000),
creates precedent for a religion-based domestic abuse claim. In that case, the BIA granted asylum to a
young woman whose father beat her to punish her for what he perceived as her liberal religious
beliefs, which differed from what the court described as his "fundamentalist Muslim beliefs"
concerning the proper role of women in Moroccan society. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1330-31,
1337.
196.

Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2005).

197. See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Simply because [the applicant] did
not call himself a dissident or couch his resistance in terms of a particular ideology renders his
opposition no less political.").
198. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute, Real ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, as recognized in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 533
F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 555 F.3d 734 (9th
Cir. 2009).
199.

12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).

200. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242, 1244. Ms. Fatin described her feminist political opinion as her "deeprooted beliefs in freedom of choice, freedom of expression [and] equality of opportunity for both
sexes." Id. at 1237 (alteration in original). The court denied her claim because it found that the record
did not establish that she would suffer persecution on account of these political beliefs. Id. at 1242-43.
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Majano v. INS, 2 01 the applicant, whose husband had recently fled their native El
Salvador, was targeted by a sergeant in the Salvadoran armed forces. 202 The
military officer raped her at gunpoint and subjected her to brutal physical and
sexual violence for months thereafter. 203 The Ninth Circuit found Ms. LazoMajano's rejection of the sergeant's view that he "has a right to dominate [a
woman] and . . . force her to accept this opinion without rebellion" constituted a
viable political opinion. 204
Given the law and existing legal precedent, survivors of intimate partner
violence are theoretically eligible for protection based on their political opinions.
A political opinion in a domestic violence-based asylum case might be framed,
for example, as defiance of male dominance or challenge of traditional gender
roles that support a man's unrestrained abuse against his intimate partner.
However, although viable in theory, no court has granted such a claim in a
published decision.
In Matter of R-A-, the BIA rejected Ms. Alvarado's claim that she was
persecuted on account of her imputed political opinion that women should not
be dominated by men. 205 The Board focused on the fact that Ms. Alvarado did
not "recount her husband saying anything relating to what he thought her
political views to be, or that the violence toward her was attributable to her
actual or imputed beliefs." 206 The BIA ascribed the abuser's "unchecked
violence" to "the inherent meanness of his personality" 207 as opposed to his
reaction "to any objections made by the respondent to her husband's domination
over her." 208
The BIA used similar reasoning in its rejection of the political opinion
claims in both Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G-. In Matter of L-R-, the
BIA found that [t]here is no record evidence that the female respondent was
politically active or made feminist/anti-male domination political statements." 209

201.

813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled by Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).

202.

Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1433.

203.

Id.

204.

Id. at 1435.

205. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G.
2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), stay lifted, 24 1. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
206.

Id. at 915.

207. Id. at 926. Courts' preoccupation with abusers' individual personality traits reveals a gender
bias in asylum jurisprudence. As Professor Anjum Gupta noted, in cases of intimate partner violence,
judges routinely find "that the abuse occurred because the abuser was a 'despicable person,' because
of his 'inherent meanness,' because of his alcohol abuse, because of his jealousy, or because of other
'personal' or 'criminal' reasons." Anjum Gupta, Dead Silent: Heuristics, Silent Motives, and Asylum, 48
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016). Conversely, in "traditional" asylum claims, such as those "in
which the applicant is fleeing a repressive dictatorship, immigration judges . . . do not stop to ask
whether the dictator is a 'despicable person' or to otherwise inquire about the personal characteristics
or failings that led to his violence. Id.
208. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 915. The BIA also stated that "this is not a case where
there is meaningful evidence that this respondent held or evinced a political opinion, unless one
assumes that the common human desire not to be harmed or abused is in itself a 'political opinion."'
Id.
209.

DHS Brief in Matter ofL-R-, supra note 167, at 22.
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In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the IJ held that the "abuse was the result of 'criminal
acts, . . . ' which were perpetrated 'arbitrarily' and 'without reason."' 210 And in
Matter of A-B-, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions opined that Ms. A-R-C-Gwas a woman facing "horrible . . . personal circumstances" 211 who was
"attacked ...
because of [her] preexisting personal relationship" with her
abuser. 212
By focusing on the individual characteristics of abusers, courts and thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions have ignored the structural conditions and
cultural views that contribute to a man's belief that he can abuse his wife with
impunity. They perpetuate the mistaken belief that domestic violence is about
one partner's animus toward another as opposed to an epidemic that both results
from and perpetuates male privilege as well as female subordination. In denying
political opinion claims in favor of a particular social group analysis, courts
oversimplify intimate partner abuse and discount the fact that such violence is
"systemic and structural, a mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is
built upon male superiority and female inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and
expectations, and the economic, social and political predominance of men and
dependency of women." 213
A dissenting judge in Matter of R-A- recognized the political nature of
domestic abuse and acknowledged that "domestic violence exist[s] as a means by
which men may systematically destroy the power of women, a form of violence
rooted in the economic, social, and cultural subordination of women. [Its]
fundamental purpose . . . is to punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the
victim on account of her gender . . . ."214 Ultimately, however, asylum law
continues to favor claims "where the political opinion is stated in the classic form
of joining a political group and engaging in public activities of a political
nature." 215 The claims of women fleeing domestic violence suffer "from the
perceived flaw of being personal rather than political in nature, and the
persecution occurs at the hands of an intimate partner who may not know or
216
care that he is responding to a political statement."

210. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-,
27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogatedby Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-CV-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL
6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
211.

Matter ofA-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.

212.

Id. at 339.

213.

Copelon, supra note 92, at 305.

214. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 939 (B.I.A. 1999) (Guendelsberger, Board
Member, dissenting) (citation omitted), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008). The dissent also noted that
institutional biases that prevent women from seeking protection "appear to stem from a pervasive
belief, common in patriarchal societies, that a man should be able to control a wife or female
companion by any means he sees fit: including rape, torture, and beatings." Id. at 930 (quoting the IJ's
findings).
215. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the Public/Private
Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 117, 120
(2012).
216.

Id.
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The narrow conception of political opinion embraced by courts in cases of
intimate partner violence is not supported by asylum law, yet survivors of
domestic abuse remain unable to obtain relief on that ground. A discussion of
whether the reframing of intimate partner abuse as terrorism alters that analysis
follows in Section V, after a brief review of one additional related aspect of the
asylum definition.
B.

State Action and the Public-PrivateDistinction

A final element of the asylum definition relevant to the analysis of claims
based on intimate partner violence is state action. An applicant for asylum must
prove that she was "unable or unwilling to avail ... herself of the protection of"
her home country. 217 in other words, an individual seeking asylum must show
that the government of her home country was either the persecutor or unable or
unwilling to protect her from a private persecutory actor. 218
The state action requirement is pertinent to the analysis of asylum based on
intimate partner violence because a significant component of the harm of
domestic abuse emanates from the failure of states to provide appropriate
resources to remedy and/or punish violence perpetrated by private actors.
Moreover, states not only fail to protect and provide redress to individual victims
but also neglect to address the beliefs and conventions (both in the legal system
and outside of it) that allow violence against women to continue.
As a result of the state (in)action requirement, when a survivor of intimate
partner violence testifies that she did not seek the assistance of law enforcement
prior to fleeing from her home country, she is at risk of losing her case despite
the fact that her call to police would have been futile given societal attitudes
toward and official policies relating to domestic abuse. 219 Governments' refusals

217. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018). The unable or unwilling standard has been adopted by
"the Board of Immigration Appeals, every Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States
Supreme Court." Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1, Grace v. Sessions, No. 1:18-cv-01853 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 7, 2018) (on file
with author). Importantly, those courts have also held that "harms inflicted by private actors can
constitute persecution under U.S. asylum laws when the government of the home country is unwilling
or unable to protect the applicant." Id. However, in Matter of A-B-, Sessions stated that those seeking
refuge from harms perpetrated by non-state actors must demonstrate that "government protection
from such harm . . . is so lacking that their persecutors' actions can be attributed to the government."
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. Sessions provided no citation or rationale for his use of this
heightened legal standard. See id.
218. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). For example, although Matter of A-R-C-G- was a seminal
case that first recognized asylum protection for a survivor of domestic violence, the BIA did not
actually grant Ms. A-R-C-G- lawful status. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A.
2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316. The court recognized and validated the
particular social group to which she belonged but remanded the case to the IJ to determine whether
"the Guatemalan Government was unwilling or unable to control the 'private' actor." Id.
219.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 23 (2017),

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277575.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RWS-DX6Z] (noting that
in El Salvador, the country from which Ms. A-B- sought asylum, "laws against domestic violence
remained poorly enforced, and violence against women, including domestic violence, remained a
widespread and serious problem"); see also Immigration & Refugee Bd. of Canada, El Salvador:
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to intervene, provide protection, or take steps to combat intimate partner
violence can be explained by what scholars have described as the "public and
private . . . distinction." 220 This term is used to describe a phenomenon wherein,
for example, a violation such as rape that occurs in the public sphere of "politics,
government and the state" is considered a human rights violation, unlike a rape
that occurs in the privacy of one's home or within one's family. 22 1
The delineation of public and private is not a neutral act, as the "[m]eanings
of 'private' and 'public' are based on social and cultural assumptions of what is
valued and important, . . . assumptions [that] are deeply gender-based."222
Feminist scholars have argued that
[n]owhere is the effect ... of the public/private split more evident than
in the case of domestic violence which literally happens "in private."
States dismiss blatant and frequent crimes, including murder, rape, and
physical abuse of women in the home, as private, family matters, upon
which they routinely take no action. 223
In intimate partner abuse cases, the BIA has recognized only one particular
social group that focuses on the individual relationship between the victim and
her abuser, namely, that she was unable to escape his violence. 224 Similarly, the
failure to understand opposition to domestic violence as a political opinion
reinforces the notion that violence toward an intimate partner is a private act
rather than the product of a patriarchal culture that condones violence against
women. Stated another way, if domestic violence is understood as a purely
private act, with no impact on or connection to society at large, it can be argued
that the government has no responsibility to address domestic abuse. 225 Thus,
"[p]rivacy reinforces the idea that the personal is separate from the political." 226

Domestic Violence, Including Legislation, State Protection and Support Services, REFWORLD (Sept. 17,
2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b8c724.html
[http://perma.cc/6GSC-8TMT] (noting that
women in El Salvador "frequently reported that they did not go to police to report the violence
because of the fear of retribution, as well as the lack of protection from the police").
220.

See

HILARY

CHARLESWORTH

&

CHRISTINE

CHINKIN,

THE

BOUNDARIES

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAw 232 (2000).

221. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379, 382
(1999); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Questioning Hierarchiesof Harm: Women, ForcedMigration, and
International Criminal Law, 11 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 463, 464 (2011) (explaining that private,
opportunistic violence against female forced migrants is overlooked by governments and excluded
from international criminal law with respect to criminal accountability).
222.

Schneider, supra note 101, at 978.

223.

Thomas & Beasley, supra note 96, at 1123.

224. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388-89 (B.I.A. 2014) (granting relief based on the
particular social group of "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship"),
overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
225. As Professor Elizabeth Schneider argued, "[I]n the so-called private sphere of domestic
and family life, which is purportedly immune from law, there is always the selective application of law.
Significantly, this selective application of law invokes 'privacy' as a rationale for immunity in order to
protect male domination." Schneider, supra note 101, at 977. Ironically, this selective application is in
itself a political act.
226.

Id. at 979.
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In sum, this brief review of the law reveals that the road to asylum for
survivors of intimate partner abuse is a challenging one. Obtaining relief under
the particular social group ground is an increasingly onerous task, particularly
for unrepresented applicants, given the nuanced legal requirements and
significant evidentiary burdens. Asylum based on political opinion is even more
elusive, not only because no legal precedent exists for a survivor of intimate
partner violence receiving protection based on this ground but also due to
courts' reluctance to recognize the public nature of domestic abuse. As discussed
below, reconceptualizing domestic violence as terrorism in the home has
potential to alter these analyses, thereby expanding access to asylum for
survivors.
V.

BENEFITS OF RECONCEPTUALIZATION

Reconceptualizing intimate partner violence as terrorism has several
potential benefits for survivors seeking asylum in the United States.
Understanding domestic abuse as terrorism underscores the political, societal,
cultural, and public dimensions of the problem, leading to a more expansive
asylum analysis that accurately accounts for the lives and circumstances of
survivors.
First, and importantly, "[f]raming domestic violence as everyday terrorism
draws attention to its horror and severity." 22 7 As Professor Catharine
MacKinnon noted, "[A]cts of violence against women are regarded not as
exceptional but inevitable, even banal." 228 Such beliefs have deep historical
roots, as society has long minimized the harms, serious character, and public
nature of intimate partner abuse. The U.S. legal system has been validating such
beliefs since 1873, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina maintained that in
cases of intimate partner violence, "[i]f no permanent injury has been inflicted,
nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to
draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and
forgive." 22 9 Both the general public and law enforcement routinely ignored
abuse in the home and even blamed victims for the violence they suffered. 230 A
belief in marital privacy and the sanctity of the home led to norms and even
prohibitions against interference in the affairs of a married couple, even in cases
23
of suspected abuse. 1

227.

Pain, supra note 134, at 532, 534 ("The analysis here centres on the role of fear.").

228. MacKinnon, Women's September 11th, supra note 100, at 6. MacKinnon also observed that
"[i]t is hard to avoid the impression that what is called war is what men make against each other, and
what they do to women is called everyday life." Id. at 27.
229.

State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874).

230. SCHECHTER, supra note 88, at 58 (describing a belief widely held by law enforcement
officials that women are at fault for the domestic abuse they suffer because "[t]hey always go back" to
their abusive husbands).
231. See, e.g., DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 93-94 (1976) (describing that, in 1975 the
Oakland Police Department published a "Training Bulletin on Techniques of Dispute Intervention"
that detailed a policy of non-arrest in situations of domestic violence).
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Rhetoric, however, plays a role in how the problem of domestic violence is
understood. Labeling intimate partner violence as terrorism acknowledges both
the serious nature of intimate partner violence and the societal responsibility to
address it. Moreover, the terrorism label may allow adjudicators who are
reluctant to acknowledge the gravity of intimate partner abuse to recognize it as
rising to the level of persecution required under the asylum analysis. Unlike
domestic violence, terrorism is not something our culture ignores or
minimizes. 23 2 Instead, our culture views terrorism as a serious offense with grave
consequences and devotes significant resources to punish and prevent it. 233
Moreover, while terrorism is generally recognized as societally destructive,
domestic abuse remains a "private" issue. 23 4 Understood as a terrorist act,
however, intimate partner violence takes on equivalent gravity and the public
responsibility to combat it becomes clearer.
This change in viewpoint occurs because labels matter. In the area of
immigration, for example, courts, administrative agencies, academics, and the
media have all considered the appropriate descriptor for those who are not
lawfully in the United States.235 Debates continue over whether to utilize the
terms "undocumented" or "illegal" and the semantic significance of each. 23 6 The
United States' defining of immigrants as "aliens" 237 stands in stark in contrast to
Canada's label of "newcomer." 238 More recently, conservatives have sought to

232. See Alexander, supra note 18, at 78-79 ("[T]errorism has proved very successful in
attracting publicity, disrupting the activities of government and business, and causing significant death
and destruction.").
233.

See, e.g., id. at 88-89.

234.

Schneider, supra note 101, at 974.

235. See, e.g., Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 718 F.3d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir.
2013) ("We recognize that using the term 'alien' to refer to other human beings is offensive and
demeaning. We do not condone the use of the term and urge Congress to eliminate it from the U.S.
Code."); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND

POLICY 452-53 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing the use of the phrases "illegal aliens," "undocumented
aliens," and "unauthorized migrants"); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1440-42
(1995) (analyzing the meaning of, and critiquing use of, the term "illegal alien"); Roque Planas,
"Illegal vs. Undocumented" Debate: Obama and Romney Weigh In at Town Hall Meeting,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/17/illegal-vsundocumented-presidential-debate_n_1974654.html [http://perma.cc/B2W7-WXYQ].
236. See, e.g., Cristina Costantini, Linguists Tell New York Times that "Illegal" Is Neither
'Neutral' nor 'Accurate', ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ABCUnivision/1linguistsyork-times-illegal-neutral-accurate/story?id=17366512 [http://perma.cc/8T47-T8EZ]; Gene Demby, In
ImmigrationDebate, 'Undocumented' vs. 'Illegal'Is More than Just Semantics, NPR (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:30
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/30/170677880/in-immigration-debate-undocument
ed-vs-illegal-is-more-than-just-semantics
[http://perma.cc/N2CA-AGPB];
Which Is Acceptable:
'Undocumented' vs. 'Illegal' Immigrant? (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=122314131 [http://perma.cc/U76Z-3F84].
237.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2018).

238. See Find Free Newcomer Services Near You, GOv'T OF CANADA, http://www.cic.gc.cal
english/newcomers/services/index.asp [http://perma.cc/2X6Z-W6NW] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019);
Marisa Pefialoza & John Burnett, For a Stark Contrast to U.S. Immigration Policy, Try Canada, NPR
(Jan. 26, 2017, 5:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/01/26/511625609/for-a-stark-
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recast the family-based immigration system as "chain migration." 23 9 Similarly,
the domestic violence community has long considered whether the appropriate
label for an individual who has endured intimate partner abuse is survivor or
victim. 240 Some advocates reject these formulations altogether, opting instead for
the neutrally descriptive "person/woman/man who has experienced violence." 241
"Naming and categorizing is not a neutral activity; it is a deeply political one"
that is imbued with deeper meaning and significance. 242 As such, simply
relabeling or classifying intimate partner violence as terrorism in the home
operates to transform the once private and personal experience of domestic
violence into a social and political issue. 243
Highlighting the political nature of intimate partner violence in turn impacts
survivors' access to asylum in the United States. "Although battering has
evolved from a 'private' to a more 'public' issue, it has not become a serious
political issue," 244 which prevents asylum adjudicators from moving from
particular social group analysis toward recognition of opposition to abuse as
political opinion. As discussed in Section IV and as Professor Anjum Gupta
explained, "[I]mmigration judges determining nexus in cases involving private
harms may have a difficult time finding that the abuse occurred on account of
the victim's political opinion, despite the fact that many instances of domestic
violence do occur when the victim is asserting her rights as a woman." 245
Linking terrorism and domestic abuse makes the political implications of
intimate partner violence easier to see. Abusers use violence, fear, and threats to

contrast-to-u-s-immigration-policy-try-canada [http://perma.cc/J9KQ-32UN].
239. David Nakamura, 'Language as a Weapon': In Trump Era, Immigration Debate Grows
More Heated over What Words To Use, WASH. PosT (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/language-as-a-weapon-in-trump-era-immigration-debate-grows-more-heated-over-whatwords-to-use/2018/01/21/d5d9211a-fd6a-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html
[http://perma.cc/T4TBV6YE].
240. See, e.g., Catherine Donovan & Marianne Hester, 'I Hate the Word "Victim"': An
Exploration of Recognition of Domestic Violence in Same Sex Relationships, 9 Soc. POL'Y & SOC'Y
279, 282 (2010); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course:Moving from White
Victim to Multi-CulturalSurvivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2006).
241. See Replicating the UN Multi-Country Study on Men and Violence: Understanding Why
Some Men Use Violence Against Women and How We Can Prevent It: Preferred Terminology,
PARTNERS
FOR PREVENTION,
http://www.partners4prevention.org/sites/default/files/preferred
terminologyjfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/UA9P-LCXY] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
242.

Marcus, supranote 10, at 25.

243. If reframing domestic abuse as terrorism illuminates the political nature of intimate partner
violence, it also helps acknowledge "that the roots of [domestic] violence lie in the structural
inequality and subordination of women." See Copelon, supra note 92, at 367. Feminists have long
argued "that battering results from an historically created gender hierarchy in which men dominate
women." SCHECHTER, supra note 88, at 224. This hierarchy results in men being "privileged physically,
financially, and socially" and is what allows them to abuse their wives and partners with impunity.
Simmons et al., supra note 125, at 65. Ultimately, this ordering "is political in nature because it is part
of a social construct meant to keep one group dominant over another . . . [in] societies [that] wish to
preserve the patriarchal system of men's dominance over women." Cianciarulo, supra note 215, at 155.
244.

Schneider, supra note 101, at 983.

245.

Gupta, supra note 207, at 45.
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overcome opinions contrary to their own, which is precisely what terrorists do.246
As evidenced by Schmid's definitional analysis, few think to question whether or
not a violent act that is traditionally considered to be terrorism has political
motivations. 24 7 A new label for domestic violence thus emphasizes the political
underpinnings and societal implications of the otherwise personal experience of
intimate partner violence. 248 in other words, it politicizes what was previously
seen as a family pathology, achieving the long-held feminist goal of making the
personal political.
Experts have lamented that "U.S. courts responsible for adjudicating
asylum claims continue to view intimate partner violence primarily as an
aberration that occurs due to various psychological and social factors rather than
a problem inherently political in nature." 249 Such views will not change as long as
survivors of domestic abuse are considered members of a particular social group
of women who are unable to leave a relationship as opposed to political
revolutionaries who fight against systemic hierarchies of gender oppression
within the context of their relationships.
Although political opinion presently "tends to be disfavored as a basis for
gender-based asylum claims," 250 reframing domestic abuse as terrorism has the
potential to change that dynamic. If an abuser is conceived of as a terrorist, he is
by definition seeking to overcome his victim's views or assert his own views in
contrast to hers, making the political nature of his violence more readily
apparent and asylum based on political opinion easier to obtain for survivors.
For example, if the adjudicators in Matter of R-A-, Matter of L-R-, Matter
A-R-C-G-, and Matter of A-B- had utilized the framework of terrorism to
understand the abuse that the women in those cases suffered, it is less likely that
they would have concluded that the perpetrators' actions were arbitrary or
unconnected to broader political motivations.
In addition to highlighting the political nature of domestic abuse,
reconceptualizing intimate partner violence as terrorism in the home makes it
easier to recognize the state's complicity in that violence. Feminist scholars have
long argued that "[w]ife-beating is . . . not an individual, isolated or aberrant act,
but a social license, a duty or sign of masculinity, deeply ingrained in culture,
251
widely practiced, denied and completely or largely immune from sanction."
Eventually, albeit often subtly, this culturally accepted belief has become a
legally sanctioned one. 252 Experts have described the existence of patriarchy as a

246. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schmid's analysis of
various definitions of terrorism.
247. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schmid's analysis of
various definitions of terrorism.
248.

See Berrington, supra note 139.

249.

Eg., Cianciarulo, supra note 215, at 138-39.

250.

Id. at 140.

251.

E.g., Copelon, supra note 92, at 335.

252. Thomas & Beasley, supra note 96, at 1122 ("[G]ender bias, if unchallenged, becomes so
embedded in the social structure that it often assumes the form of a social or cultural norm seemingly
beyond the purview of the state's responsibility, rather than a violation of women's human rights for
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"parallel state" that the government, "through inaction as well as action"
ultimately empowers to allow "men to mediate and often block women's
relationships with the state." 253 In this manner, the government becomes
complicit in reinforcing and perpetuating the subordination and oppression of
women, and intimate partner violence becomes the "manifestation of a state
belief in male dominance." 254
Within this framework, the abuser-as-terrorist operates not in opposition to
the state but in concert with it. He fights not against the government but instead
to preserve the patriarchy that the state is interested and complicit in preserving.
The target, of course, is his wife or partner who resists oppression and violence
against her. Utilizing this scenario, the asylum analysis for survivors of intimate
partner abuse gains clarity. The government, aligned with the abuser, is no
longer unable to protect her but is instead unwilling to do so due to its aligned
interests with the persecutor, making cases of domestic violence look more like
those of traditional political or human rights activists subjugated by oppressive
governments or regimes they oppose.
Relatedly, reconceptualizing domestic violence as terrorism in the home
also helps bridge the public-private distinction. While "[g]lobal terrorism looms
large as a defining horror of our times[,] . . . its domestic counterpart is relatively
overlooked. One is seen as an outcome of mass religious zealotry, the other as a
matter of private melodrama and personal failings." 255 As discussed above,
asylum jurisprudence has also relegated intimate partner violence-and genderbased violence more generally-as a personal or private problem rather than one
that has broader societal implications and that the government has a role in
addressing. 256 Reframing domestic abuse as terrorism counteracts that tendency.
A shift in the understanding of intimate partner violence from something
that happens in the privacy of one's home to something akin to the broader
societal issue of terrorism makes it easier to conceptualize the role of domestic
violence in systematic subjugation and the need for a public response. As
Professor Elizabeth Schneider stated, "By seeing woman-abuse as 'private,' we
affirm it as a problem that is individual, that only involves a particular . .
257
relationship, and for which there is no social responsibility to remedy."
Conversely, if domestic abuse is reframed as terrorism, it is no longer a private
problem involving one specific intimate relationship, but instead it is a public
issue for which there is a social responsibility to remedy.
In addition to specific implications for the asylum analysis addressed above,
reconceptualizing domestic violence as terrorism in the home presents an
opportunity to promote gender equality in asylum jurisprudence more broadly.
which the state is accountable.").
253.

Copelon, supra note 92, at 351.

254. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a
Basis for Refugee Protectionfor Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 369 (2009).
255.

Berrington, supra note 139.

256. See supra Section IV for an analysis of intimate partner violence-based asylum
jurisprudence.
257.

Schneider, supra note 101, at 983.
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Reframing domestic abuse as terrorism makes gender differences less significant
to the determination of whether one merits asylum, as women fleeing terrorism
are no different than men fleeing terrorism. This increasingly gender-neutral
approach can ultimately create greater fairness in the adjudication process.
For example, in a previous article I argued that the Matter of A-R-C-Gparticular social group perpetuates the victim-blaming phenomenon, which shifts
blame for domestic violence from the abuser to the victim for not taking steps to
avoid his violence. 258 The unable to leave formulation leads one to ask, "Why
not?"-a more succinct version of "Why didn't she just leave?" 259 Reframed as
terrorism, however, such questions take on a different connotation. Unlike
survivors of intimate partner abuse, victims of terrorism are not asked why they
did not flee or what they did to provoke violence. With terrorism, the onus is
placed where it belongs-on the perpetrator. Conceiving of abusers as terrorists
can facilitate the necessary shift in questioning from "Why does she stay?" to
"Why does he abuse?"
Relatedly, reconceptualizing domestic violence as intimate terrorism can
also produce an asylum adjudicatory system that is more empowering for
survivors of abuse. I have previously criticized the unable to leave formulation as
denying agency to battered women by forcing them to advance narratives that
portray themselves as helpless, passive, and powerless victims. 260 A reliance on
essentialized narratives of helplessness can be remedied by reframing intimate
partner violence because the focus of the inquiry shifts from the victim's
purported failings to the rationale behind the perpetrator's actions. When a
"traditional" terrorist strikes, we ask why he committed violence. Analogized to
domestic abuse, the inquiry becomes what caused him to target her, as opposed
to why she allowed herself to be targeted. 26 1
Lastly, if survivors of domestic violence are considered victims of terrorism,
they may be eligible for greater protections and benefits. Currently, immigrant
survivors of domestic abuse are ineligible to receive public benefits or otherwise

258. Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum, supra note 192, at 761-62. See generally Francis X.
Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsibility and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (2011) (discussing victim blaming in the context of sexual assault); Jerry von Talge,
Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family Violence Directed
Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 131 (2000) ("A second
dimension of the multiple victimization of women is societal blame .. .. ").
259.

See generally OLA W. BARNETT & ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE, IT COULD HAPPEN TO

ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY (1993) (discussing the cognitive and social reasons why
battered women stay with their abusers); WHY DOESN'T SHE JUST LEAVE? (Heather Stark & Emilee
Watturs eds., 2008) (explaining recent research and telling real women's stories to explore why women
remain with their abusers); Buel, supra note 86 (delineating fifty reasons why abuse victims stay with
their abusers).
260. See generally Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum, supra note 192 (noting that asylum
jurisprudence perpetuates a historical categorization of battered women as helpless, passive, and
powerless).
261. This final question also recognizes the significance of separation violence, which as detailed
supra in Section II, describes the escalation of violence and higher rates of physical assault toward
women following attempts to break free from violent relationships or otherwise assert their
independence from their abusers.
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benefit from the safety net that native-born survivors rely on. 262 Such
prohibitions, however, are based on the immigrant survivors' status as
undocumented victims of the "mere" crime of intimate partner abuse.263 If they
are conceived of as survivors of terrorism, additional resources and support may
become available. For example, victims of terrorist attacks are entitled to certain
tax benefits and relief, including disability payments and tax forgiveness. 264
Congress has also demonstrated significant interest in providing special
protections for survivors of terrorism, including the recent passage of the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which amended the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to allow civil claims against a foreign state for harms resulting
from an act of terrorism. 265 Support for the measure was so significant that it
passed overwhelmingly in both houses of Congress and was the only instance in
President Obama's presidency when Congress overrode his veto. 266
Reframing intimate partner violence has the potential to benefit survivors
of intimate partner violence seeking protection in the United States. The label of
terrorism highlights the severity of domestic abuse and could impact many
aspects of the asylum analysis, including acknowledging the political
underpinnings of intimate partner abuse, recognizing state complicity in
domestic violence, and minimizing the public-private distinction. Conceiving of
private violence as a public problem can also bring about both gender equality
and empowerment for survivors. However, although benefits exist,
reconceptualizing intimate partner abuse as terrorism in the home is not without
challenges, for as discussed in detail below, unintended consequences may result
from increasing the use of the terrorist label.

262.

See TANYA BRODER ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT

ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 1 (2015), http://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C9AF-XPT6]
(discussing that the
"major federal public benefits programs have always left some non-U.S. citizens out of eligibility for
assistance," and that after even more restrictive laws were introduced in 1996, "the participation of
immigrants in public benefits programs decreased sharply . . . , causing severe hardship for many lowincome families who lacked the support available to other low-income families"); Leslye E. Orloff et
al., With No Place To Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.O.
313, 324 (1995) ("[V]irtually all public assistance programs bar undocumented immigrants from
receiving benefits and limit the eligibility of legal residents.").
263. See Nermeen Arastu et al., What Jeff Sessions' Efforts To Deny Asylum to Domestic
Violence Victims Look Like on the Ground, SLATE (July 16, 2018, 1:56 PM), http://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/07/what-jeff-sessions-efforts-to-deny-asylum-to-domestic-violence-victims-look-like.html

[http://perma.cc/84US-Y8JB] (discussing the decision of the United States to do away with asylum for
domestic violence survivors and stating that the decision "rel[ies] on outdated stereotypes, such as the
notion that domestic violence is a 'private' or 'purely personal' matter involving 'individualized'
circumstances").
264.

See generally IRS, PUB. 3920, TAx RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (2014),

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3920.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3WT-K48Y].
265. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, sec. 3, 130 Stat. 852, 853
(2016) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(c)).
266. See Jennifer Steinhauer et al., Congress Votes To Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2dkxCaB [http://perma.cc/G228-AWSM].
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DRAWBACKS OF RECONCEPTUALIZATION

Prior to discussing potential disadvantages to reconceptualizing intimate
partner violence as terrorism in the home, it is important to clarify the manner in
which such a reframing might occur. On one end of the spectrum is a full-scale
legal approach, which would involve changing multiple definitions of terrorism,
terrorist, and terrorist activity in existing law to include domestic violence. On
the other end of the spectrum is simply utilizing the new terminology as a
narrative or advocacy device. The former would have more official and dire
consequences than the latter, but both should be considered when analyzing
potential outcomes of using the terrorist label.
As one of the main benefits of reframing domestic violence is to increase
access to asylum protection, it is important to be mindful of the significant and
severe immigration consequences of the terrorist designation. An individual who
is found to have engaged in terrorist activity or is deemed likely to engage in
terrorist activity after entry is inadmissible to the United States. 26 7 Individuals
suspected of being inadmissible as a result of engaging in terrorist activity can be
removed without a hearing. 268 Terrorist activity also serves as a ground of
deportability for those who are already inside the United States 269 and a basis for
mandatory detention.2 7 0 Lastly, and significantly here, a determination that an
individual engaged in terrorist activity bars asylum27 1 and admission as a
refugee. 272
The INA's prohibitions on terrorists are a double-edged sword for survivors
of intimate partner violence. If domestic abusers are considered to have
"engage[d] in terrorist activity," 273 it would be more difficult for them to enter
the United States and easier for them to be removed. Although this may be
perceived as a benefit for some survivors who have fled to the United States to
seek safety from a violent partner, such draconian measures may not be suitable
for all situations. Not all "battered women want to end their relationships,
invoke the power of the legal system to keep their batterers away, and ultimately
sever all legal ties with their abusers." 274 Many simply want the abuse to stop. In
such cases, the immigration repercussions for a batterer-turned-terrorist may be
275
against the interests of the survivor.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i),

267.

8 U.S.C.

268.

Id. § 1225(c)(1).

(ii) (2018).

269.

Id. § 1227(a)(4)(B).

270.

Id. § 1226(c)(1).

271.

Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).

272.

Id. § 1157(c)(3).

273.

Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)

274.

Goodmark, supra note 102, at 8.

(defining the term "engage in terrorist activity").

275. For example, a woman may come to the United States to seek protection from violence but
may still rely on the abuser for financial support for their children. This is often the case when the
abusive partner is the primary breadwinner in a family, a common occurrence when his exertion of
power and control takes the form of economic abuse. See Bill Glaser, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:An
Ethical Paradigmfor Therapists in Sex Offender Treatment Programs, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 143,
156-57 (2003). In such cases, his absence can be highly damaging to a woman and her children.
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This is particularly true when considering the impact and danger of
separation violence. A survivor's departure from her home country, possibly
with the children she shares with her abuser, is an unmistakable signal that she
will no longer tolerate abuse or the batterer's control; it can therefore be a
significant triggering event for separation assault.2 7 6 And if the abuser is turned
away or deported from the United States under terrorism grounds, he may
blame the victim for the actions of the U.S. immigration authorities and seek
retribution in the form of further violence against her or her family members.
Retaliatory violence may even "be motivated by knowledge of supportive or
protective resources [available in the United States] for women, particularly in
men who believe such services deprive them of their rightful authority or control
in intimate relationships."2 7 7 If immigration consequences lead to an escalation
of violence, the terrorist designation has the unintended effect of making a
survivor less safe.
Additionally, immigration consequences may not only impact abusers. Dual
arrest occurs when officers responding to a family violence call cannot easily,
immediately, or readily identify the primary aggressor.2 7 8 As a result, they arrest
both parties, even if a perceived situation of mutual combat was in fact the
279
female victim acting in self-defense, protecting herself from a male aggressor.
In such cases, victims are labeled perpetrators-and therefore terrorists
themselves-and could face the same severe immigration consequences
discussed above. Moreover, because the spouses of those determined to have
engaged in terrorist activity are also inadmissible to the United States under
certain circumstances, a survivor need not even be charged with domestic
280
violence to suffer the detrimental effects of terrorist bans.
Although caution is merited, the immigration consequences of reframing
intimate partner violence as terrorism may be limited by the law itself. The INA
definition of "terrorist activities" must involve certain specific actions including
hijacking or sabotage of an aircraft, vessel or vehicle; hostage taking; a violent

276. See Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S.
Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 39
(2002) ("Battered women are in the greatest danger when they separate from an abusive partner.").
277. Laura Dugan et al., Exposure Reduction or Retaliation? The Effects of Domestic Violence
Resources on Intimate-PartnerHomicide, 37 L. & SoC'y REV. 169, 174 (2003).
278.

See

DAVID

HIRSCHEL

ET AL.,

EXPLAINING

THE

PREVALENCE,

CONTEXT,

AND

CONSEQUENCES OF DUAL ARREST IN INTIMATE PARTNER CASES 4, 12 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [http://perma.cc/V8EB-088C] ("'[D]ual arrest' ...
parties involved in an incident are arrested.").

arises when both

279. Officers arresting victims occurs more frequently in jurisdictions that have implemented
mandatory arrest policies, which compel officers who respond to a domestic violence call to effectuate
an arrest once probable cause has been established. See, e.g., David Hirschel, Domestic Violence Cases:
What Research Shows About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates, NAT'L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV.
(July 25, 2008), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222679.pdf [http://perma.cc/58FU-BE3X].
280. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX) (2018) (deeming inadmissible spouses of individuals
who are inadmissible for having engaged in terrorist activities). Exceptions exist for spouses who did
not or should not have known about the terrorist activity and for persons who engaged in terrorist
activity but then renounced the activity. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
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attack on an internationally protected person; assassination; or the use of a
biological agent, chemical agent, nuclear weapon, explosive, firearm, or other
weapon or dangerous device with intent to endanger the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 281 The list is long and
expansive, and as the Third Circuit has noted, the "definition of 'terrorist
activity' sweeps in not only the big guy, but also the little guy who poses no risk
to anyone." 28 2 However, given the extreme nature of the actions listed in the
definition, it is likely that only the final provision-use of a firearm or weapon
with intent to endanger-would be implicated in most situations of intimate
partner violence.
Thus, the definition of "terrorist act" in the INA serves as an important
mitigating factor against the potentially negative effects of reconceptualizing
domestic violence as terrorism in the home. Adhering to the existing letter of the
law would lead to only the most serious and violent offenses being labeled as
terrorist acts. This would allow for nuance and gradation; not all incidents of
intimate partner abuse would be subsumed under the terrorist label, and
relatedly only the most dangerous offenders would be at risk of immigration
consequences.
While some of the definitions in the INA may serve as a mitigating force in
one aspect, several other definitions in both immigration and federal law
potentially counsel against reframing domestic abuse as terrorism. The term
"engage in terrorist activity" is broadly defined in the INA, encompassing not
only committing a terrorist act but also inciting, preparing, planning, or soliciting
individuals or funds (or other things of value) for a terrorist act. 283 The law
makes inadmissible anyone who has provided "material support" for either the
commission of a terrorist act or to an individual who the actor knows, or
284
reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit terrorist activity.
Material support can include seemingly innocuous acts such as providing "a safe
house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material
financial benefit." 285 Thus, if an abuser is deemed a terrorist, this expansive
definition could conceivably encompass the actions of his victim who prepares
him a meal, pays rent for an apartment they share, drives him to work, or allows

281.

Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).

282.

McAllister v. Attorney Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 191 (3d Cir. 2006) (Barry, J., concurring).

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).

283.

See 8 U.S.C.

284.

Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).

285. Id. Many scholars have criticized the breadth of the material support provisions. See, e.g.,
Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for
Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 518-19 (2002); Barbara Hines, An Overview of U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy Since 9/11, 12 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 9, 12 (2006); David Cole, Opinion,
Chewing
Gum for
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2,
2011),
http://nyti.ms/2A1VcmP
[http://perma.cc/L3HG-9GJU]. The impact of the ban on vulnerable populations such as asylees and
refugees is also subject to criticism in both academic and advocacy communities. See, e.g., ELEANOR
ACER ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED (2016); Jennie Pasquarella,

Victims of Terror Stopped at the Gate to Safety: The Impact of the "Material Support to Terrorism" Bar
on Refugees, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2006, at 28, 28-32.
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him to use her cell phone. 286 Under existing law, no duress exemption exists for
the material support bar,287 so the only option for relief is to receive a
discretionary "situational exemption" from the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services. 288
Two final potential legal concerns regarding use of the terrorist label for
domestic abusers relate to harboring. The USA PATRIOT Act contains a
provision that makes it a crime for individuals to harbor or conceal anyone they
know or should have known had engaged in, or was about to engage in, federal
terrorism offenses. 289 As with material support, it is conceivable that a victim
could be charged under this provision if domestic abusers were labeled as
terrorists. If, for example, the survivor and her abuser cohabitated in an
apartment that she leased or owned, or if she did not call the police to report the
abuse she suffered, she may meet the statutory definition of harboring.
These concerns are particularly acute given the dynamics of domestic
violence and the justice system's treatment of survivors. Intimate partner
violence is often cyclical, encompassing recurring phases of "tension building, an
acute battering incident, [followed by] loving contrition." 290 Thus, because every
moment in a relationship with an abuser is not always bad or because a survivor
may align herself with the abuser in order to make herself or her children
safer, 291 she may assist, support, 292 or harbor him, opening herself up to criminal
prosecution. 293 Precedent for such action exists, as prosecutors have used tools
such as subpoenas, bench warrants, and even prosecutions for perjury to punish
victims who refuse to testify against their abusers in criminal court. 294
A related concern is "whether violent men whose targets are women, who
operate with essential impunity worldwide, will be seen as 'harbored' by the

286. For example, Noor Salman, the wife of Orlando nightclub shooter Omar Mateen and a
survivor of his domestic abuse, Traister, supra note 108, was arrested on federal material support
charges, Merrit Kennedy, Orlando Shooter's Wife Arrested on Federal Charges, NPR (Jan. 16, 2017,
2:29
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/16/510107483/orlando-shooters-wifearrested-on-federal-charges [http://perma.cc/GBX3-PYPH].
287. See Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757, 764 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that no implied
exception exists for the provision of material support to a terrorist organization while under duress,
and thus, absent a waiver, one who affords such support is inadmissible and statutorily barred from
establishing eligibility for asylum).
288. See Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG)-Situational Exemptions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/unassigned/terrorism-related-inadmissibilitygrounds-trig-situational-exemptions [http://perma.cc/5NKQ-N2JK] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
289.

USA PATRIOT Act § 803, 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2018)).

290. Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome
by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789,795 (1996).
291. A victim might stay with her abuser, decline to involve law enforcement in her life, or even
side with her abuser against the police because she is "in a better position to choose [how to protect
herself], as she knows best what her partner is capable of and what is likely to occur from the
separation." Mordini, supra note 102, at 323.
292.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.

293.

See id. § 2339.

294. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39
N.M. L. REV. 149, 160 (2009).
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states that effectively permit, hence condone and support, their acts." 295 If So,
under a reconceptualized view of intimate partner violence, abusers' home
countries could be designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism.
Such an action, or calls for the U.S. government to take such action, would be
diplomatically sensitive. The effects could also be wide-ranging. 296 However,
such a scenario is unlikely, as currently only four countries have received such a
designation. 297
In addition to the specific legal concerns articulated above, broader
philosophical concerns exist when considering labeling domestic abusers as
terrorists. A significant disadvantage of describing intimate partner violence as
terrorism is the expansion of a term that is both politically charged and
imprecise. 298 As detailed in Section I, the terrorist label is a loaded one that is
rarely deployed in a racially or religiously neutral manner; increasing utilization
of the term in a new and often controversial area may exacerbate concerns about
its improper and harmful use. Citing such concerns, some have even called for a
discontinuation of the use of the word terrorism entirely. They argue that even
when it may be technically or semantically correct to describe an event as a
terrorist attack, the term is frequently utilized in an "arbitrary and loaded"
manner which leads to harmful political and legal implications. 299 Although
intimate partner abuse was certainly minimized in the past, labeling domestic
abusers as terrorists may swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.
Relatedly, scholars have decried the exoticization of domestic abuse, which
places a disproportionate focus on forms of violence perpetrated against women
in non-Western cultures, such as forced marriage, female genital
mutilation/cutting, or bride burning, while diminishing or tacitly accepting
"ordinary" domestic abuse in one's own backyard.300 Conceiving of gender-

295.

MacKinnon, Women's September 11th, supra note 100, at 18.

296. A country designated as a state sponsor of terrorism faces sanctions in four main
categories: (1) restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, (2) a ban on defense exports and sales, (3)
certain controls over exports of dual use items, and (4) miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl4151.htm
[http://perma.cc/XU4N-L78T] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
297.

Id. (listing North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism).

298.

See supra Section I for a discussion of the expansion of the term terrorism.

299. Adam Ragusea, Terrorist Is Now a Biased Term. JournalistsShould Stop Using It., SLATE
(July 12, 2016, 1:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexiconvalley/2016/07/12/it-s-time-for_
journaliststo-stop.using.the word terrorism.html [http://perma.cc/B4VH-4A7M] (analogizing to the
media's decision to no longer use the term "illegal immigrant" because "the term simply became too
judgmental, too toxic for neutral copy" (emphasis omitted)). The Reuters News Agency has
discontinued use of the terms terrorist or terrorism to describe an event unless the words are used in a
direct quote. See Handbook of Journalism, REUTERS, http://handbook.reuters.com/index.
php?title=T#terrorism.2C terrorist [http://perma.cc/2YUT-QBN2] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
300. See generally Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us,
DAEDALUS, Fall 2000, at 125, 128 ("Perhaps a better explanation for the salience of women in media,
political, and scholarly discussions of cultural accommodation and human rights is simply the
fascination of the exotic and the erotic, associated with the sexual, the private, the home-and the
female. . . . [T]here does indeed seem to be something compelling, arresting, even captivating about
stories of women murdered for male or family honor, or about the cutting of female genitals. Such
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based violence in this way needlessly highlights cultural differences, encourages
hierarchies, and encourages distinctions between us and "the other." 301
Reconceptualizing intimate partner violence as terrorism in the home has the
potential to perpetuate this line of harmful thinking. The terrorist label makes
domestic abuse more exotic or glamorous, which may not be a net positive if
only this exoticization makes intimate partner violence a problem deemed
worthy of combatting. Moreover, to the extent that the label of terrorism makes
the frequent occurrence of intimate partner abuse seem as rare as a large-scale
terrorist attack, that too distorts the reality of violence women suffer on a daily
basis. 302
A final feminist critique of reframing domestic abuse as terrorism relates to
concerns about the perpetuation of carceral feminism, a term used to describe
"an approach that sees increased policing, prosecution, and imprisonment as the
primary solution to violence against women." 303 Reframing intimate partner
violence as the crime of terrorism seeks to emphasize the seriousness of the
offense, which, as discussed above, is a positive step. However, the terrorist label
also evokes notions of a problem worthy of a strong criminal justice response,
which notable feminist scholars have argued is problematic in the area of
304
domestic violence.
These scholars' critiques have focused on carceral feminism's disregard of
"the ways in which race, class, gender identity, and immigration status leave
certain women more vulnerable to violence" and the related idea "that greater

stories simultaneously horrify and entice."); Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculuralism, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2001) (critiquing the "binary discourse" that frequently structures the
parameters of the debate between feminist values and multiculturalism); Leti Volpp, On Culture,
Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 393, 394 (2002) (describing
the "tendency to describe domestic violence as 'cultural' when occurring in communities of color, and
not through the language of power and control used to describe domestic violence in 'mainstream'
communities").
301.

See Minow, supra note 300, at 128.

302. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence reports that, on average, nearly twenty
people per minute are physically abused by an intimate partner in the United States. Statistics, supra
note 72.
303. Victoria
Law, Against CarceralFeminism, JACOBIN
(Oct.
17,
2014),
http://www.
jacobinmag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminism [http://perma.cc/U6VD-L3XS]; see also Elizabeth
Bernstein, Militarized HumanitarianismMeets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and
Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns,36 SIGNS 45, 47 (2010).
304. See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and FeministLaw Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A CriticalReview, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001) (critiquing the overemphasis of criminal
justice interventions in attempts to solve the problem of domestic violence); Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999) (considering ways in which
prosecutors, judges, and the courts can play a constructive role in combating family abuse);
Goodmark, supra note 102 (examining the legal interventions most frequently employed by advocates
for survivors and detailing the problems that result from reliance on these strategies); Linda G.
Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550
(1999) (positing that survivors are safest and feel most respected when they willingly partner with state
actors to investigate and prosecute domestic violence crimes).
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criminalization often places these same women at risk of state violence." 305 A
unitary focus on a criminal justice or punishment-based response to intimate
partner abuse also marginalizes alternative responses to intimate partner
violence and ignores the root causes of abuse, including "social and economic
inequities" as well as "factors that exacerbate abuse, such as male entitlement,
economic inequality, the lack of safe and affordable housing, and the absence of
other resources." 306
As detailed above, serious immigration consequences exist for those who
are designated as terrorists, including inadmissibility, removability, and
detention. Expansion of the controversial terrorist label may adversely impact
both perpetrators and survivors accused not only of engaging in terrorist activity
themselves but also of harboring or providing material support to terrorist
actors. Moreover, a feminist lens also cautions against terminology that has the
potential to exoticize or further criminalize domestic violence. The significant
ramifications of reframing intimate partner violence as terrorism in the home
thus demands serious consideration prior to such a reconceptualization.
CONCLUSION

The gravity of intimate partner violence has long been diminished by
adjudicators tasked with granting asylum to individuals fleeing persecution. The
consequences of judges continuing to disregard the "political and cultural
context of gender-based power and control" and instead deeming domestic
abuse a private problem that exists only within the context of an individual
relationship are grave. 307 Yet these acts of violence do not occur in isolation or
outside of a broader patriarchal social construct; as feminist scholars have
argued, they are "mass atrocities, mass human rights violations, widespread and
systematic attacks on the basis of sex, crimes against humanity pervasively
308
unaddressed."
The World Health Organization reports that nearly one-third of women
who have been in a relationship have experienced some form of physical or
sexual violence by their intimate partner. 309 "Globally, as many as 38% of
murders of women are committed by a male intimate partner." 310 The incidence
of domestic abuse in immigrant communities is so high that experts have labeled
it a pandemic. 311 Given these alarming statistics, the United States must do more
to prevent abuse and protect survivors. Reframing the narrative around domestic
violence can be an important step in that fight.
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We must, however, be mindful of the consequences of such action, or we
risk creating one problem in the course of attempting to solve another. The
drawbacks of reconceptualizing intimate partner violence as terrorism in the
home that are addressed in Section VI above caution us to proceed carefully and
deliberately and to not utilize the terrorist label for all purposes but instead in a
nuanced manner. Just as "not every form of violence that is evil or
reprehensible . . . constitutes terrorism," 312 not every domestic abuser is a
terrorist. In our zeal to serve and assist survivors, we cannot ignore or collapse
"important distinctions along various dimensions of the problem-degree of
severity, for example, or periodicity of occurrence." 313
Professor Michael Johnson's work in the field of sociology illuminates both
the importance and practical applications of such distinctions. His work teaches
that not all intimate partner violence is analogous; abuse that implicates patterns
of power and control, and therefore broader political considerations, is
distinguishable from both defensive violence and violence that is situationally
provoked. 314 Targeted approaches are therefore required to address the varied
forms of violence between intimate partners. For example, services such as
counseling or batterer intervention programs might be effective mechanisms to
attempt to treat what Johnson calls intimate terrorism or situational couple
violence but are inappropriate to address violent resistance.
Building on this differentiating approach to domestic violence, this Article
ultimately concludes that the conceptual framework of terrorism in the home is a
potentially useful advocacy tool, but it should not be formally or broadly
implemented in immigration law. Just as Johnson's label of intimate terrorist is
not appropriate for all batterers, it is also not suitable for all perpetrators in
domestic violence-based asylum cases. Although it is tempting to use the
terrorist label to more accurately describe the structural root causes of intimate
partner violence and to help asylum adjudicators understand both the serious
nature of the harms that befall survivors as well as why survivors of intimate
partner abuse are appropriately categorized as victims of political persecution,
the drawbacks of employing the terrorist label ultimately outweigh the benefits.
Therefore, this Article does not recommend that the Immigration and
Nationality Act be amended to designate domestic abuse as a terrorist act, nor
does it recommend that domestic abusers be designated as terrorists. 315

312. James M. Lutz, A Critical View
TERRORISM, Dec. 2010, at 31, 37.

of Critical Terrorism Studies, PERSPECTIVES ON

313. Ken Corvo & Pamela Johnson, Vilification of the "Batterer":How Blame Shapes Domestic
Violence Policy and Interventions, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 259, 261 (2003).
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See supra Section II for a discussion of how intimate partner violence is defined.

315. Such a recommendation is in line with other areas of domestic violence law and advocacy,
wherein different definitions of intimate partner violence are utilized depending on their context. For
instance, statutory definitions in criminal law are used to convict offenders for the crime of domestic
violence. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D)(1) (West 2019) (defining "domestic
violence"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2) (West 2019) (defining "assault" with an
enhancement for assault committed against a family or household member or in a dating relationship);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(A), (B) (West 2019) (delineating penalties for the crime of "assault and
battery against a family or household member"). But the definition(s) of abuse utilized by advocates
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However, given the significant commonalities between intimate partner
violence and terrorism, attorneys can, without using the label itself, utilize the
concept of terrorism in the home to inform their advocacy, frame their
arguments, and advance the asylum claims of survivors of domestic abuse.
Reconceptualizing intimate partner violence in such a way can potentially
expand access to asylum for survivors, as it acknowledges the structural and
political nature of intimate partner abuse, thereby opening the door to claims
based not just on membership in particular social groups but instead on political
opinion.
Moreover, as the terminology surrounding domestic violence continues to
evolve and Marcus's terrorism in the home and Johnson's intimate terrorism
labels gain greater acceptance in the advocacy community, such language may
ultimately work its way into the legal system. In that event, and if attorneys
determine that the benefits of the terrorist label outweigh potential costs, only
"extreme" forms of intimate partner abuse should be branded with the label of
terrorism. Importantly, the term extreme here signifies not the severity of the
abuse suffered but instead the motivations underlying the violence. Drawing on
Schmid's definitional analysis, the terrorist designation is appropriate not for any
violent act but only those with political motivations and inflicted in order to
instill fear. It is only in such cases that the power, control, and political
implications that underlie intimate partner abuse compare to terrorist acts.
Ultimately, in recognition of potential drawbacks, this Article does not
advocate for statutory or regulatory change to codify a new framework for
analyzing intimate partner violence through the lens of terrorism, nor does it
suggest that the terrorist label is appropriate for every incident of domestic
abuse. However, in extreme cases where the label is appropriate, a reframed
narrative would allow for a broader, deeper, and ultimately more accurate
understanding of intimate partner violence, which would be a critical step in
affording necessary protections to survivors.

encompass significantly more than what exists in the criminal codes. Nonlegal descriptions of intimate
partner abuse include a range of behaviors encompassed under the label of coercive control, such as
emotional, financial, and psychological abuse, nearly all of which would not violate domestic violence
laws. See STARK, supra note 73, at 198-216 (describing tactics of nonphysical abuse that compose a
relationship defined by coercive control).

